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THE IRRATIONAL LEGACY OF ROMER V. EVANS: A
DECADE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW REVEALS THE NEED
FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY OF LEGISLATION THAT
DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION TO MEMBERS OF THE
GAY COMMUNITY
KATE GIRARD*
1. INTRODUCTION
Romer v. Evans' marked the first time that the U.S. Supreme Court used an equal
protection analysis to hold unconstitutional a law that discriminated against
members of the gay community.2 While the decision brought instant hope that the
tide had finally turned in our nation's history of legalized homophobia,3 a decade of
precedent reveals that Romer' s usefulness lies in upholding rather than overturning
law that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation.4
In Romer, the majority held that the state action in question, Colorado's
Amendment 2, 5 was an outright failure of the Equal Protection Clause.6 The Court
additionally held that the amendment failed rational basis scrutiny.7 While the
Court's decision to invalidate Amendment 2 under rational basis review can be
viewed as a refusal to evaluate laws that discriminate against the gay community
through a more heightened lens of scrutiny, it can also be understood as part of the
Court's decision not to use heightened scrutiny when a case fails to demand it.'
Romer does not hold that laws that classify on the basis of sexual orientation are
subject to rational basis scrutiny.9 Yet, lower courts consistently cite Romer as the
decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided not to classify members of the
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1. 517 U.S. 620 (1996), affig 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994).
2. Id. at 635. Throughout this Comment I choose to use the terms "gay community" and "same-sex
couples" in their broadest sense. This community is marked (like any) by its diversity and includes lesbians, gay
men, bisexuals, transgendered persons, and anyone else who, by identity, orientation, practice, or any other reason,
is categorized for legal purposes by their lack of membership in the heterosexual community.
3. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MicH. L REV. 203,
203-04 (1996); Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in JudicialArgument
over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REv. 893, 894; Katherine M. Hamill, Comment, Romer v. Evans: Dulling the Equal
Protection Gloss on Bowers v. Hardwick, 77 B.U. L. REv. 655, 656 (1997); Courtney G. Joslin, Recent
Development, Equal ProtectionandAnti-Gay Legislation:Dismantlingthe Legacy ofBowers v. Hardwick-Romer
v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L REv. 225, 225 (1996); Kevin G. Walsh, Comment,
Throwing Stones: Rational Basis Review Triumphs over Homophobia, 27 SETON HALL L REv. 1064, 1065 (1997).
4. See infra Parts n1-11. The sole and major exception is law that impacts the purely private lives of gay
individuals and couples. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a Texas criminal sodomy
statute as a violation of the liberty and privacy rights ensured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
5. See infra note 41.
6. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (stating that Colorado's Amendment 2 was a "denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense"); see infra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
7. Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
8. Id. at 625-26, 631-32.
9. Id. at 635.
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gay community as a suspect group or protected class.' 0 As a result, a decade of lower
court precedent cites Romer for the rule that law that classifies on the basis of sexual
orientation is presumed valid so long as the statute is rationally related to any
legitimate state interest."
This Comment argues that lower courts fail to read Romer thoroughly. 2 As a
result, courts have failed to provide members of the gay community with protections
necessary to ensure their full equal protection under the law. 3 With ten years of
precedent to demonstrate this non-comprehensive reading of Romer, it is time for
the U.S. Supreme Court to either clarify its analysis in Romer or heighten its tier of
equal protection scrutiny of governmental action that classifies, limits, or removes
the rights of members of the gay community on the basis of their sexual
orientation. 4
Part II of this Comment tells the story of Romer, including the passage of the
Colorado amendment that created the judicial controversy, a procedural history
marked by arguments surrounding equal protection scrutiny status for members of
the gay community, and the outcome of this controversy as written by Justice
Kennedy ten years ago.15 Part III demonstrates the legal impact and judicial
implications of ten years of Romer-based rational basis scrutiny directed at anti-gay
legislation and amendments, most specifically in regard to marriage and adoption.
Part IV bridges this discussion to New Mexico and argues that, based on New
Mexico's unique equal protection jurisprudence and the state's strong policy of
protecting the rights of New Mexico's gay community, rational basis scrutiny may
be enough to invalidate law that discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation. In
the alternative, if rational basis proves insufficient, recent New Mexico case law
demonstrates that New Mexico may be prepared to heighten its scrutiny of
legislation that classifies on the basis of sexual orientation to the intermediate level.
In conclusion, this Comment argues that, as rational basis review has proven
insufficient in providing the gay community true equal protection under the law,
heightened intermediate scrutiny is necessary. While the federal and many state
courts may not be prepared to take such a step, this Comment argues that New
Mexico is.
UI. BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL TIERS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
SCRUTINY AS APPLIED TO ROMER V. EVANS
A. The Federal Tiers of Equal Protection Scrutiny
[I]f the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means
anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm

10.
11.
12.
13.

See infra Part IM1.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-36.
See infra Parts 11-111.
See infra Parts 11-1H1.

14.

See infra Parts 11-LM.

15. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 629.
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a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.6

The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause states that no state shall
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 17 To
assess Equal Protection Clause claims, the U.S. Supreme Court utilizes an analytical
framework designed to minimize the Court's intrusion into the political process and
to address the need "to reconcile the principle with the reality"' 8 that all law
effectively discriminates against some. 9
Traditionally, the Court employs three tiers of judicial review in its assessment
and analysis of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims."0 The tier chosen
depends upon the class of individuals affected as well as the rights implicated by the
government action in question.2' To determine the appropriate tier, the Court looks
to a history of discrimination and political powerlessness as well as to social policy
and legislation that discriminates against a specific class of individuals.22
Classifications that implicate an individual's fundamental rights or that impact
a "discrete and insular minorit[y] ''23 are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the
state to demonstrate (1) how the classification furthers a compelling governmental
interest and (2) how that classification is narrowly tailored to further that compelling
interest. 24 Based on U.S. Supreme Court precedent, race/national origin' and
alienage 26 qualify for strict scrutiny review. Strict scrutiny is also triggered when the
state action in question negatively impacts a fundamental constitutional right.27 A
middle tier of intermediate scrutiny applies to classifications based on gender' and
illegitimacy. 29 Classifications affecting these "quasi-suspect" groups require the state
to demonstrate that the classification is substantially related to a sufficiently
important governmental interest. 30 For all other classifications, the test is rational

16. U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,534 (1973) (striking down a law that prevented members
of the "hippy" community from qualifying for food stamps because the law was based on irrational prejudice)
(emphasis added).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. Romer, 517 U.S. at631.
19. See id.
20. See City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (detailing the Court's
three tiers of equal protection analysis).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (arguing that more demanding

scrutiny than rational basis may be appropriate when legislation is aimed at "discrete and insular minorities" who,
because of prejudice against them, are unable to protect themselves through ordinary political processes).
24. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
25. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that "all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and subject to "the most rigid scrutiny").

26. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (holding that classifications of legally admitted aliens
are "inherently suspect and are therefore subject to strict judicial scrutiny").
27. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that anti-miscegenation laws that prohibit

interracial marriages are unconstitutionally violative of the fundamental right to marry).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
29. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (holding that classifications based on the
paternity of a child do not qualify for strict scrutiny but do require more demanding scrutiny than rational basis

review).
30. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).
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basis, under which classifications are presumed to be constitutional as long
3 as they
are rationally related to any conceivable legitimate governmental interest. '
After City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,32 some legal
commentators opined that a new, heightened form of rational basis scrutiny emerged
under which state actions are not assumed rational.33 This commentary was fueled
by Justice Marshall's argument that although the majority in City of Cleburne
claimed to use the rational basis standard, the reality, from his perspective, was a
more exacting standard than traditional rational basis review.34 In response,
however, the Court has made clear that there is no such thing as a more active form
of rational basis review.35 On the other hand, the Court does not treat all cases that
demand rational basis scrutiny similarly.36 The Court provides greater deference to
the state in cases that deal with taxation,37 regulation of social welfare programs,38
and "ordinary commercial transactions. When faced with an equal protection civil
rights claim, the Court analyzes the law and the state's asserted reasons more
rigorously.40
B. A History of Discrimination:Romer v. Evans and Colorado'sPassage of
Amendment 2
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of

31. Seeid. at440.
32. Id. at 450 (finding that an ordinance requiring group homes for persons with mental retardation to
acquire special permits was based on irrational prejudice).
33. See Spiro P. Fotopoulus, The Beginning of the End for the Military's Traditional Policy on
Homosexuals: Steffan v. Apsin, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 611, 627-28 (1994); Richard B. Saphire, Equal
Protection, Rational Basis Review and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 KY. L.J. 591, 620-22
(1999-2000); Joslin, supra note 3, at 239; Walsh, supra note 3, at 1065-67.
34. See City of Cleburne,473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Perhaps
the method employed must hereafter be called 'second order' rational-basis review.... [H]owever labeled, the
Marshall went on
rational basis test invoked today is most assuredly not the [traditional] rational-basis test....").
to object to the majority's "refusal to acknowledge that something more than minimum rationality review is at work
here." Id. at 459.
35. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993) (rejecting the notion that in City of Cleburne the
majority applied a different standard than rational basis review).
36. See Brief of the Am.Bar Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9-10, Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), available at 1995 WL 17008433 (arguing that the Court applies a more
rigorous form of rational basis review when an equal protection claim implicates civil rights protections).
37. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11 (1992).
38. Bowen v. Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986).
39. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
40. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,442 (1982) (Blackmun, J., separate opinion) (stating
that in fair employment practices claims "[t]he State's rationale must be something more than the exercise of a
strained imagination; while the connection between means and ends need not be precise, it, at the least, must have
some objective basis").
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persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination.4
The issue in Romer was Colorado's 1992 passage of Amendment 2,42 an
amendment that claimed to put members of the gay community in "the same
position as all other persons"43 but in reality denied them fundamental equal
protection guarantees.' Beginning in the late 1970s, several municipalities within
the State of Colorado passed legislation aimed at protecting the gay community from
discrimination within their communities.45 In response to these legislative initiatives,
which many deemed an improper legislative attack upon traditional family and
societal moral values, Amendment 2 arose, with its design to rescind all state and
local laws designed to protect the gay community and to remove from all three

branches of government the power to protect the gay community in the future. 4
Colorado for Family Values (CFV), the organization that drafted Amendment 2
and the organization credited with the amendment's passage,47 focused its public
campaign on the repeal of "special rights."48 Members of the gay community
"already have the same rights everyone else has-the right to be protected against
discrimination on the basis of their race, gender, religion, age, and disability."4 9 CFV
argued that passage of Amendment 2 was not an issue of hostility toward the gay
community, but rather one that endorsed "fairness" through the elimination of
additional special rights that anti-discriminatory legislation unlawfully provided for
the gay community. 0 CFV's message, as told by its pamphlets, books, and media
campaign, was that the gay community is not a disadvantaged minority meriting
anti-discrimination protection because the gay community (1) is wealthier than
most;5 l (2) is marked by immoral behavior rather than immutable traits such as race,

41. COLO. CONST. art. [I, § 30b. Article IL section 30b is titled, "No Protected Status Based on Homosexual,
Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation." Id.
42. Id.
43. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,626 (1996).
44. Id. at 632.
45. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT § 10-3-1104(I)(f)(VIH) (2006) (forbidding health insurance providers from
determining insurability and premiums based on an applicant's, a beneficiary's, or an insured's sexual orientation);
DENVER, COLO. CODE art. IV, §§ 28-91 to -116 (2006), availableat http'//www.municode.com/resources/gateway
.asp?pid=10257&sid=6 (prohibiting discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations on the
basis of sexual orientation); BOULDER, COLO. CODE § 12-1 (2000), available at http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/
index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=1594&Itemid--960 (same); AsPEN, COLO. CODE § 15.04.570
(1971), available at http://www.ordlink.com/codes/aspen/ (same); Colo. Executive Order No. D0035, at 31 (Dec.
10, 1990), availableat http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/dhr/rules/docs/execorderspolicies.pdf (prohibiting employment
discrimination for "all state employees, classified and exempt," on the basis of sexual orientation).
46. See Samuel A. Marcosson, The "Special Rights" Canard in the Debate over Lesbian and Gay Civil
Rights, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcs&PuB. POL'Y 137, 137 n.l (1995).
47. See STEPHEN BRANSFORD, GAY PoLrrlcs vs. COLORADO AND AMERICA: THE INSIDE STORY OF
AMENDMENT 2, at 41 (1994).
48. See Richard F. Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual Rights and Citizen Initiatives: Is
ConstitutionalismUnconstitutional?,9 NOTRE DAME J.L ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 93, 96 (1995).
49. Id. at 94 n.7.
50. See Marcosson, supra note 46, at 140 ("For example, if gay men and lesbians were granted the right to
commit murder, that would be a 'special right' in the sense that it is not possessed by heterosexuals."); Will Perkins,
Views on Gay Rights Conflict, DENy. POST, Oct. 11, 1992, at 1D, 5D.
51. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the Discourse ofEquivalents,
29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 283, 292 (1994) (quoting Will Perkins, Executive Chairman of the Board of Colorado
for Family Values, who claimed that gays are far from oppressed, as "gays are one of the most privileged groups
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gender, and disability; 2 (3) is acceptant of pedophilia; 3 (4) promotes sexual
promiscuity;' and (5) dies young, partly because of AIDS." CFV's message was
that homosexuality is a choice, gays are abhorrent of family, and providing gays
with "special rights" is a direct threat to basic freedoms.5 6 Finally, CFV campaigned
that Amendment 2's elimination of "special rights" would save the government
money, maintain community order, promote family autonomy, and advance
religious liberty.5
On November 3, 1992, after CFV's massive ballot-signing and media campaign,
the electorate of the State of Colorado passed constitutional Amendment 2 into
law.58 Nine days later, Colorado Governor Roy Romer, claiming the amendment
unconstitutional, filed suit in the Denver district court to enjoin enforcement of
preliminary injunction
Amendment 2. 9 The Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the
61
granted by the district court' and later made it permanent.
C. The Colorado Court's Choice of Strict Scrutiny
In upholding the preliminary motion to enjoin enforcement of Amendment 2, the
Colorado Supreme Court determined that, because Amendment 2 potentially
burdened a fundamental constitutional right through the legal endorsement of
"private biases," strict scrutiny should apply.62 The court focused on the
disenfranchising effect of Amendment 2, arguing that the amendment not only
placed impermissible prohibitions on governmental localities 63 but also denied a

in the country, sporting average annual household incomes [of] over $55,000"); see also Brief for Petitioners at 42,
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), available at 1995 WL 310026 (defending Colorado's
conclusion that gay men and lesbians are "politically powerful and relatively privileged"); but see Eric Heinze, Gay
and Poor, 38 How. L.J. 433, 435 (1995) (asserting that, based on findings of significant wage disparity between
homosexual and heterosexual men of similar education, experience, and occupation and findings that lesbian and
bisexual women earned less than their heterosexual counterparts, "gays are economically disadvantaged in the
United States due to 'direct' and 'indirect' discrimination").
52. See Colorado for Family Values' Ballot Pamphlets in Support of Amendment 2, reprinted in WuILLAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN. D. HUNTER, SEXUALrrY, GENDER, AND ThE LAw 1527 (2d ed. 2004).
53. Id. at 1525 (claiming that homosexuals molest children and provide children with educational material
to "try and convince children-maybe even your own-that they should consider homosexuality").
54. Id. at 1527 (arguing that "monogamy is virtually unknown in the gay lifestyle").
55. Id. (claiming that the average age of death for gay men is forty-two and that lesbians die by the age of
forty-five).
56. Id. at 1523-31. In their pamphlets, CFV additionally contended that "immoral gays" do not deserve
special rights, arguing that, if allowed special rights, children may have to dorm with "a gay" in college or
heterosexuals could even lose their jobs to them.
57. See Schacter, supra note 51, at 290-94 (1994) (discussing the deceit-filled CFV campaign that fueled
the passage of Amendment 2).
58. This polling data was cited to by the Colorado Supreme Court in Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272
(Colo. 1993). See alsoBRANSFORD, supra note 47, at 1 (stating that Amendment 2 passed by a vote of 813,966 to
710,151 (53.4% to 46.6%)).
59. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1272 (joining in the lawsuit was the Boulder Valley School District RE-2, the City
and County of Denver, the City of Boulder, the City of Aspen, and the City Council of Aspen).
60. Id. at 1286.
61. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994).
62. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282.
63. Id. at 1284-85.
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targeted class the right to "obtain[] legislative, executive, and judicial
64 protection or
redress from discrimination absent.. .a constitutional amendment."
The following year, the Colorado Supreme Court ordered a permanent injunction
against enforcement of Amendment 2.65 In reaching its final decision, the court
revisited and reaffirmed its previous decision to apply strict scrutiny. 66 The court
held that as the "Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution protects
the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process... any legislation
or state constitutional amendment which infringes on this right by 'fencing out' an
independently identifiable class of persons must be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny., 67 Under strict scrutiny, the state could not meet its burden; the court found
none of the state's asserted interests compelling.68
With the Colorado Supreme Court's repeated use and justification of strict
scrutiny on the record, the issue for the U.S. Supreme Court was framed. 69 Not only
would the Court have to issue a final decision regarding the fate of Amendment 2,
it would also have to decide under what rationale to make its decision. 70 In 1995,
just one year before Romer, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that states have
the right to enact law that protects the rights of the gay community, marking the first
time the Court acknowledged that members of the gay community may actually
have rights.7" Now the Court was asked to further define those rights.72 While the
decision was pending, the citizens of fourteen states pushed for constitutional
amendments similar to Colorado's Amendment 2.
D. Romer v. Evans and the U.S Supreme Court's Scrutiny Conundrum
Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and each of its
parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance.74

64. Id. at 1285.
65. Evans, 882 P.2d at 1338.
66. Id. at 1341 n.3.

67. Id. at 1339.
68. Id. The interests that the Colorado court found not compelling included:
(1) deterring factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's political functions; (3)
preserving the ability of the state to remedy discrimination against suspect classes; (4) preventing

the government from interfering with personal, familial, and religious privacy; [and] (5)
preventing government from subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group....
Id.
69. See infra Part ll.D.
70. See infra Part II.D.
71. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995)
(recognizing the right of states to enact legislation that protects members of the gay community from discrimination
on the basis of their sexual identity).
72. See infra Part ll.D.
73. See Michael Booth & Steven Wilmsen, The Great Divide: Basic Values at Heart of Debate, DENv. POsT,
Sept. 19, 1993, at DI; see also Daniel J. Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me in: The Unconstitutionalityof
Amendment 2 and English-Only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 690, 691 n.7 (1995) (discussing jurisdictions in

which amendments similar to Colorado's had been voted on or were pending).
74.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
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On February 21, 1995, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the state
of Colorado's petition for writ of certiorari in the case of Romer v. Evans.75 In
addition to the Petitioner and Respondent Briefs, the Court accepted over two dozen
Amicus Briefs, the majority on behalf of Respondents: those who won the judicial
battle to strike down Amendment 2 in the Colorado Supreme Court.76
The legal issue confronted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Romer was whether
Colorado's Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 77 which demonstrates the "commitment to the law's neutrality where
the rights of persons are at stake., 78 In framing the analysis, the majority "attempted
to reconcile the principle with the reality... that, if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." 79
Whereas the Colorado Supreme Court found Amendment 2 to be an unconstitutional
violation of a fundamental right, 80 and thus adopted a strict scrutiny analysis,8'
Justice Kennedy explicitly stated that, in affirming the Colorado court's result, the
U.S. Supreme Court analyzed Amendment 2 on different grounds.82 The Supreme
Court overturned Amendment 2 on two grounds: (1) Amendment 2 was a per se
violation of the Equal Protection Clause 83 and (2) Amendment 2 failed even the
most deferential rational basis review.'
In deciding that Amendment 2 constituted a per se violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, the majority relied heavily on a brief submitted by Laurence H.
Tribe aruging that "the command of equal protection extends to every person within
the state's jurisdiction, regardless of what the person might have done, and certainly
regardless of what the person might be inclined to do."85 Tribe argued that the Court
need not address nor apply its three-tiered scrutiny analysis 86 as Amendment 2 was
unlike anything the Court had previously seen: a per se violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantees. 87

75. 513 U.S. 1146 (1995). The question presented before the Court by petitioners was whether Amendment
2 violated the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See id.
76. See LISA KEEN & SuzANNE B. GOLDBERG, STRANGERS TO THE LAW 196-97 (1998).
77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.
79. Id.
80. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1279, 1282 (Colo. 1993) (concluding that strict scrutiny was proper in
situations where the "fundamental right to participate equally in the political process" is threatened).
81. Id.
82. Romer, 517 U.S. at 626.
83. Id. at 633 (stating that "[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens
than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal
sense").
84. Id. at 632-33.
85. See Brief of Laurence H. Tribe et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 10, Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), available at 1995 WL 862021.
86. id. at 4 (arguing that "[n]o extrapolation from precedents dealing with racial or other minorities, or from
precedents dealing with rights of political or legal participation, is needed to conclude that this selective preclusion
of claims of discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause").
87. Id. at 3 ("Never since the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment has this Court confronted a measure
quite like Amendment 2-measure that, by its express terms, flatly excludes some of a state's people from eligibility
for legal protection from a category of wrongs."). According to Tribe, a per se violation of the Equal Protection
Clause exists when a state's constitution "preclude[s], for a selected set of persons, even the possibility of protection
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The majority agreed with Tribe, concluding that Amendment 2 was a per se
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because it "confound[ed]... [the] normal
process of judicial review" 8 for equal protection claims, namely the three-tiered
analysis. 89 "In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance
a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the
disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous." 9°
However, as Amendment 2 "identifie[d] persons by a single trait and then denie[d]
them protection across the board," 9' the majority determined the traditional tiered
approach insufficient, 92 stating that Amendment 2's "disqualification of a class of
persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in
our jurisprudence."9 3
After holding Amendment 2 to be an outright equal protection violation, the
majority concluded that Amendment 2 also failed rational basis scrutiny.94 A law
that "impos[es] a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named
group... seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it
lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests., 95 The Court dismissed and
rejected Colorado's asserted interests for the amendment. 96 Addressing the special
rights argument, the Court concluded that civil rights protections for lesbians and
gay men are not special rights but are protections ensuring that members of the gay
community will not suffer from arbitrary discrimination. 97 Although, as the Court
acknowledged, most laws impose certain disadvantages, the harm created by
Amendment 2, which denied members of the gay community any protection under
the laws, could not be justified. 98 The Court, however, did not hold that rational
basis is the tier of scrutiny to apply when conducting an equal protection analysis
of law that implicates the rights of the gay community. 99 The Court held that, in this
case, where the law in question created extreme unconstitutional harm to the rights

under any state or local law from a whole category of harmful conduct, including some that is undeniably
wrongful." Id. at 2.
88. Romer,517 U.S. at 633.

89. Id.
90. Id.at 632.
91. Id.at633.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.at 635.
95. Id.at 632.
96. Id.at 635.
97. Id. At its extreme, it was argued that Amendment 2 would deny members of the gay community the
protection of laws of general applicability. Id.at 633.
98. Id. at 635; see also Brief of the Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation etal. in Support of Respondents at
20-21, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), available at 1995 WL 17008437 (stating that
Amendment 2 fails rational basis review because it discriminates "on the basis of blatantly invidious
motivation... [and] has the explicitly intended effect of preventing the consideration and development of
legislatively enacted approaches to the problem of discrimination").
99. Romer,517 U.S. at 635. When the Court decides that it has rejected a higher degree of scrutiny for a
specific class of individuals, it does so explicitly. See, e.g.,
City of Clebure v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 442 (1985) (stating that persons with mental retardation do not qualify for quasi-suspect classification calling
for a more exacting standard of judicial review).
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of members of the gay community, no more than rational basis was needed to
overturn the enactment. 1° °
In application, lower courts rely upon Romer for the incorrect proposition that
classifications made on the basis of sexual orientation are subject to rational basis
review.l°' Only one court to date has discussed and applied Romer's per se violation
rationale.° 2 With this incomplete reading of Romer, lower courts accept almost any
state asserted interest as legitimate. 10 3 As such, these courts fail to recognize that the
Court left open the possibility of a higher degree of scrutiny as well as the
possibility that legislative classifications designed to exclude members of the gay
community from the protection of the law may be an outright violation of equal
protection guarantees.°4 Undoubtedly, Romer was a landmark decision for members
of the gay community. Unfortunately, a narrow reading of Romer fails to provide
members of the gay community with the equal protection that Romer first
guaranteed.
III. POST-ROMER POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO
LEGISLATION THAT NEGATIVELY IMPACTS THE RIGHTS OF
MEMBERS OF THE GAY COMMUNITY
A. PoliticalResponse to Romer v. Evans
Single Most05 Important Positive Ruling in the History of the Gay Rights
Movement'
The public response to Romer was extreme on both ends of the political
spectrum.l" Suzanne B. Goldberg, then an attorney for Lambda Legal,0 7 stated that
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, while not answering all legal issues
surrounding the complexities of gay rights, "make[s] the simple yet profound point
that lesbians and gay men may not, by virtue of being members of a socially
vulnerable minority, be separated out from their neighbors and rendered strangers
to the law."' 1 8 But while some heralded Romer as the start of a new judicial era that
would recognize and protect gay rights, the decision also provoked a social

100. Romer, 517 U.S. at635.
101. SeeinfraPartill.
102. See Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963,980-82 (Wash. 2006) (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-34).
In upholding the state's defense of marriage law, which denied same-sex marriage, the court held that the denial
was not a per se equal protection violation, which requires that the law be "motivated solely by animus and that it
lacked any legitimate governmental purpose." Id. at 98 1. As the court found legitimate the state's asserted interests
in procreation and a "commitment to the institution of marriage between a man and a woman," the law was held
not to be a per se violation. Id. at 982.
103. See infra Part Ill.
104. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
105. Press Release, Lambda Legal, Statement of Lambda Starr Attomey Suzanne B. Goldberg on U.S.
Supreme Court's Striking Down Colorado's Amendment 2 (May 20, 1996), http://www.lambdalegal.orgcgibin/iowa/news/press.html?record=70. Goldberg served as counsel for Petitioners in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
106. See infra notes 107-111 and accompanying text.
107. For more information on Lambda Legal, "a national organization committed to achieving full recognition
of the civil rights of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, transgender people and those with HIV through impact litigation,
education and public policy work," see http://www.lambdalegal.org.
108. KEEN & GOLDBERG, supra note 76, at 240.
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conservative backlash.' 9 The National Legal Foundation, which supports the
"Biblical Foundations of American Law," named Romer "the worst decision in the
history of the court.""' The Federalist Society joined in the critique, claiming that
in Romer the Court ignored that the "'proper legislative end' to which Amendment
2 is directed is the preservation of [the institution of family and marriage] by
expressing societal disapprobation of sexual immorality and 'alternative lifestyles'
based on it."''

B. JudicialResponse to Romer v. Evans
The hope that Romer would bring lower courts to strike legislation that
discriminates on the basis of sexual orientation is unrealized. While in the decade
since Romer the gay community has made many important strides in combating
discrimination," 2 new legislation directed at limiting the rights of gay individuals,
couples, and families abounds, leaving the gay community more deeply
marginalized and unprotected than before Romer.' 3 For the most part, what lower
courts cite to as Romer's holding has not served to overturn this legislation.
Just one year after Romer, in Equality Foundationof GreaterCincinnati,Inc. v.
City of Cincinnati,"4 the Sixth Circuit used Romer to hold that a city charter
amendment that removed the gay community from the classes of persons protected
by city anti-discrimination laws survived rational basis review." 5 The court stated
that in Romer the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a higher degree of scrutiny than
rational basis to analyze equal protection claims involving law that discriminates on
the basis of sexual orientation. 1 6 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on the
case. 117

109. See, e.g., Katia Hetter, The New Civil Rights Battle: The Supreme Court Hands Gays a Win in the
Struggle Between Tolerance and Tradition, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 3, 1996, at 28, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/960603/archive_009163.htm (anticipating that social conservatives
would use the Court's ruling to "energize their grass-roots activists and make homosexuality a wedge issue in the
[fall 1996 election] campaign").
110. Statement of the National Legal Foundation & Minuteman Institute on Romer v. Evans, http://www
.nlf.net/Activities/briefs/Romer.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2006).
111. Robert George & Bill Saunders, Romer v. Evans: The Supreme Court's Assault on Popular Sovereignty
(2001), http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practicegroupnewsletters/civilrights/cr0l0l04.htm.
112. Since Romer was decided in 1996, (1) five more states have passed laws to prohibit workplace
discrimination to take the total to fourteen states with such prohibitions; (2) the number of employers that offer
domestic partner benefits rose from less than six hundred to over eight thousand; (3) the number of universities and
colleges offering domestic partner benefits rose from less than ninety to nearly three hundred; (4) the number of
cities, counties, and government agencies that offer domestic partnership benefits rose from less than fifty to nearly
two hundred; and (5) the number of states, counties, and cities that prohibit private sector discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation nearly doubled. See generally Human Rights Campaign Found., The State of the Workplace
for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Americans 2004 (2005), available at http://www.hrc.org/Content/
ContentGroups/Publications I/State-of..theWorkplaceWorkplace06O3.pdf.
113. See infra notes 129-139, 223-228 and accompanying text.
114. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997).
115. Id. at 301 (determining that Cincinnati's interest in conserving public costs caused by sexual orientation
discrimination complaints constituted a legitimate reason for upholding this statute).
116. Id. at 294 (stating that in Romer the U.S. Supreme Court "resolved that the deferential 'rational
relationship' test.. was the correct point of departure for the evaluation of laws which uniquely burdened the
interests of homosexuals").
117. Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998).
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Under Romer, courts have also upheld the military's policy concerning
homosexuality in the armed forces, also known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell.""' In
addition, courts consistently cite Romer as they uphold legislation and amendments
that deny same-sex couples the right to marry, the rights that accompany marriage,
and the right to foster parent or adopt a child." 9 To rationalize this denial, these
courts incorrectly rely upon Romer as the case in which the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that rational basis review is the standard to apply to legislation that treats
members of the gay community differently.
1. Marriage Rights: Romer's Inability to Overturn Federal and State Defense
of Marriage Legislation and Amendments
In 2003, a legally married same-sex Canadian couple attempted to declare each
other as family members at the U.S. border.120 A U.S. Customs agent refused to
recognize their marriage and told the men that they would have to enter
the United
22
2
States as individuals, not as a married couple.' ' The couple refused.
While the ability to travel freely and to protect one another as a couple is just one
of the hundreds of legal rights conferred by marriage, 23 many states have enacted
legislation that denies same-sex couples and their families the opportunity to seek
the protections that heterosexual couples enjoy. 24 Nearly 600,000 same-sex couples
registered as such in the 2000 census. 2 5 These couples live in the vast majority of
counties in the United States. 26 Yet nationally, new legislation directed at
prohibiting gay couples the right to marry abounds, as a majority of states have now
passed constitutional defense of marriage amendments and statutes (commonly
referred to as DOMA), which define marriage as between "one man and one
woman."127 The lobbying efforts that passed Colorado's Amendment 2, led by Focus
on the Family (the organization formerly known as Colorado for Family Values),
are strongly behind
the passage of these DOMAs in a campaign entitled "Marriage
' 28
Under Fire."'

118. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000); see, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 634-35 (2d Cir. 1998)
(distinguishing Romer's inability to find a rational basis for Amendment 2 from the military's "acceptable" rationale
of maintaining unit cohesion, reducing sexual tension, and promoting personal privacy); see also Burt v. Rumsfeld,
354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 172 n.21 (D. Conn. 2005) (citing Romer and discussing military recruiters' inability to sign
law schools' non-discrimination policies because of the military's legitimate restriction on homosexual activity, as
opposed to the illegitimate status-based classification of Romer).
119. See infra notes 139-213, 227-241, 261-272 and accompanying text.
120. Clifford Krauss, MarriedGay CanadianCouple Barredfrom U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2003, at A4,
available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0919-02.htm.
121. Id.
122. Id. (noting that the men stated that to sign two forms and enter as individuals would have been an
"affront to our dignity and human rights").
123. See Karen M. Doering, Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, 1,500 Reasons Why We Need MarriageRights,
at 1-2 (2004), http://www.nchights.org/publications/pubs/1500reasons-0304.pdf.
124. See infra notes 129-139 and accompanying text.
125. TAvIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS:
2000, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS 1 (2003), availableat http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
126. See id.
127. See infra note 134.
128. See Marriage Under Fire, http://www.marageunderfire.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2006). The website

declares:
For the past forty years, the homosexual activist movement has sought to implement a master
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Currently, only Massachusetts recognizes same-sex marriage. 129 And, as a result
of highly successful DOMA campaigns, there are currently only five other statesCalifornia, Connecticut, Hawaii, Vermont, and New Jersey-that allow same-sex
couples to enter into some form of legal partnership, be it a civil union, a reciprocal
beneficiaries relationship, or a domestic partnership.130 These legal partnerships
offer many, but not all of the rights afforded to those who marry. 131 Research
compiled by Lambda Legal Aid and the Human Rights Campaign shows that, of the
remaining states, the District of Columbia, New Jersey, New Mexico,132 New
York,133 and Rhode Island are the only ones without explicit provisions prohibiting
same-sex marriage.'34

At the federal level, in 1996, the same year the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
its decision in Romer, Congress passed the Federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA). 135 Enacted under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, 36
the federal DOMA allows states to disregard the legal marriages and civil unions of
other states. 137 To date, every court faced with a challenge to the federal or its state
plan to utterly destroy the family. Unelectable and unaccountable rogue judges have made a
habit of inventing rights that not only don't exist in the Constitution, but also contradict both the
will of the people and the actions of the legislative branch.
Id.; see also James Dobson, ElevenArguments Against Same-Sex Marriage(May 23,2004), http://www.family.org/
cforum/extras/a0032427.cfm (claiming that the legalization of same-sex marriage will severely impact, among other
things, family, children, social security, adoption, foster care, and our medical care system).
129. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the denial of marriage
rights to same-sex citizens violated the Massachusetts Constitution). But see Scott Helman, Bid Would Leave Gay
MarriagesIntact, B. GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2005, at B 1, availableat http:lwww.boston.comlnewsllocallarticles/2005/
08/30/bidwouldleave-gay-marriagesintact?mode=PF (stating that activists plan to launch a massive campaign
to gather signatures for a proposed 2008 ballot initiative to ban gay marriage). The amendment, if successful, would
leave the thousands of existing same-sex marriages intact because the amendments would have no retroactive effect.
Id.
130. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38aa (West 2005); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 572C-1; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:8A-1 to -13 (West Supp. 2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207
(2002). For a discussion of how states that provide legal domestic partnership recognition constitutionally justify
continued denial of same-sex marriage recognition, see Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259 (N.J. Super. 2005).
131. See, for example, the Federal Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000), which denies federal
marriage benefits to all couples legally partnered in these states: California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Vermont, and New Jersey.
132. For more discussion on New Mexico, see infra Part IV.
133. Unfortunately for members of New York's gay community, the highest court of New York recently ruled
that, while not explicitly prohibiting same-sex marriage, the provisions of New York's marriage law do not allow
for same-sex marriage. See Hernandez v. Robles, No. 5239, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1836, at *1 (N.Y. July 6, 2006).
134. Data gathered by the Human Rights Campaign indicates that, as of July 2006, twenty-six states have
passed laws that define marriage as between a man and a woman and will not honor marriages between same-sex
couples in other jurisdictions, while nineteen states have amended their constitutions and refuse to honor same-sex
marriages from other jurisdictions. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGELAWS (2006), available
at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=HRC&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=17961. In the November 2004 general elections, eleven states passed state constitutional amendments
defining marriage as only between one man and one woman. Massachusetts is the only state to permit same-sex
couples to obtain marriage licenses. Vermont permits same-sex civil unions. See Kathy Gill, After the Election:
Same-Sex Marriage in the US (2004), http://uspolitics.about.com/od/gaymarriage/a/statusN04.htm; Kavan
Peterson, 50-State Rundown on Same Sex Marriage Laws, KANSAS CITY INFO ZINE, Feb. 7, 2005, http://www.
infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/sid/1949/. In April 2005, the Connecticut Legislature passed both civil
union legislation and DOMA legislation that defines marriage as between one man and one woman. The bill was
signed into law on April 20, 2005. See Susan Haigh, Connecticut Becomes Second State to Approve Gay Unions
After Governor Signs Bill (Apr. 21, 2005) (on file with author).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
136. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
137. For a discussion of the implications of Congress's enactment of DOMA under the Full Faith and Credit
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DOMA has held that rational basis is the appropriate tier of scrutiny for legislation
that classifies 3on
the basis of sexual orientation and that DOMA serves a rational
8
state interest.1

In the summer of 2006, the Supreme Court of Washington upheld the state's
DOMA, finding "that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples furthers the State's
interests in procreation and encouraging families with a mother and father and
children biologically related to both."'3 Andersen represents possibly the only
judicial attempt to find legislation to be a per se violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.' 4° Andersen also represents the confusion surrounding what the U.S.
Supreme Court actually held in Romer as relating to the level of scrutiny
appropriately applied to legislation that classifies on the basis of sexual orientation.
Finally, Andersen represents the hesitance that some courts face in upholding such
classifications under rational basis review.
In Andersen, the court began by stressing that "the court's role is limited to
determining the constitutionality of DOMA and that our decision is not based on an
independent determination of what we believe the law should be."'' The court then
stated, and repeated throughout the opinion, that rational basis was the tier the court
must apply 4 2 and that this standard is "highly deferential" to the legislature. 4 3 In
deciding that rational basis was the appropriate tier,'" the court rejected arguments
that members of the gay community are a suspect class requiring heightened
scrutiny, as they failed to show that sexual orientation is immutable, 4 5 and as a class
they are not politically powerless. 4 6 Restating what it read as Romer's holding, the
court reiterated rational basis as the appropriate tier of review.' 47 After discussing
why the fundamental right to marry does not include same-sex couples, 148 the court
held that DOMA was not a per se violation of the equal protection clause' 49 and was
rationally related to legitimate state interests in procreation and familial stability,
which includes the state's "need to resolve the sometimes conflicting rights and
obligations of the same-sex couple and the necessary third party in relation to a
child." 50

Clause, see generally Paige E. Chabora, Congress'PowerUnder the FullFaith and CreditClause and the Defense
of MarriageAct, 76 NEB. L REV. 604 (1997) and Emily J. Sack, The Retreatfrom DOMA: The Public Policy of
Same-Sex Marriage and a Theory of CongressionalPower Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 38 CREIGHTON

L. REv. 507 (2005).
138. See infra notes 139-213 and accompanying text. This Comment was last updated on September 13,

2006.
139. Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 985 (Wash. 2006).
140. See supra note 102.
141. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 969.
142. Id. at 969, 983-84. It is important to note that Andersen was not argued under equal protection but rather
the state's privileges and immunities clause, for which the court utilized the "same analysis that applies under the
federal equal protection clause." Id. at 972.
143. Id. at 969.
144. Id. at 973 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
145. Id. at 974.

146. Id. at 974-75 (stating that the "enactment of provisions providing increased protections to gay and
lesbian individuals... shows that as a class gay and lesbian persons are not powerless but, instead, exercise increasing
political power").
147. Id. at 976 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 631).
148. Id. at 977-80.
149. See supra note 102.
150. Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982.
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What remains an open issue from this Washington decision is whether the denial
of marriage benefits is constitutional, about which the court declared it was "acutely
aware."'' As the plaintiffs "affirmatively asked that [the court] not consider any
claim regarding statutory benefits and obligations separate from the status of
52
marriage," the court held this issue out for another day.'
53
In Smelt v. County of Orange, a California district court used a similar analysis
to hold that, under both the California"M and Federal DOMAs, gay couples could not
marry because both pieces of legislation were rationally related to the governmental
interests of encouraging procreation and encouraging the creation of stable
55
relationships that facilitate child-rearing by both biological parents.' While the
court cited to Romer to demonstrate that "the Supreme Court does not consider
unsubstantial a constitutional challenge brought by homosexual individuals on equal
protection grounds,"' 15 6 it also relied upon Romer to hold that, "[e]ven if the rationale
for the law seems tenuous, it is rationally related to the government interest if it
bears some relation to that interest."'57
In Wilson v. Ake, 58 the court used this same line from Romer to deny a lesbian
59
couple the right to marry and to uphold both the Florida' and the Federal
DOMA.'0 The court then accepted the government's offered interests-procreation
and the support of relationships in which children are raised by their biological
6
parents-as legitimate reasons to deny same-sex couples the ability to marry. '
62
Likewise, in Stanhardtv. SuperiorCourt ex rel. County ofMaricopa, an Arizona
appellate court denied two gay men the ability to marry and cited to Romer to hold
that, even though the state DOMA163 "disparately treats an affected class[, it] is
presumptively constitutional and will be upheld if the classification rationally
furthers a legitimate state interest."'
In denying the recognition of same-sex unions, state courts also fail to assist in
the dissolution of those unions. 65 This refusal to recognize the same-sex marriages
and legal unions of other states impacts not only same-sex partners, but the children

151. Id. at985.
152. Id.
153. 374 F. Supp. 2d 861 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
154. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004).
155. Smelt, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 879-80.
156. Id. at 873 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
157. Id. at 879 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33).
158. 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
159. FLA. STAT. ANN § 741.212 (West 2005).
160. Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
161. Id.
162. 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
163. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (2000).
164. Stanhardt, 77 P.3d at 464 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-33); see also Seymour v. Holcomb, 790
N.Y.S.2d 858 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that denying a same-sex couple the right to marry does not violate New
York's equal protection and due process clauses).
165. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (refusing to dissolve a Vermont
civil union because Connecticut allows neither same-sex marriage nor same-sex domestic partnership and will not
give full faith and credit to the civil unions entered into in another state). However, given Connecticut's recent
enactment of a law that provides same-sex couples with the ability to enter into civil unions, the state may soon hold
that it can assist in the dissolution of other state's civil unions. See supra note 130.
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of gay individuals and couples. 166 In Burns v. Burns,' 67 the legal issue surrounded a
child visitation decree entered into upon the couple's divorce, which stated that "no
child visitations would occur during any time the party being visited cohabited with
or had overnight stays with any adult to whom that party was not legally married or
related within the second degree."' 68 The former wife, Susan Bums, and her samesex partner obtained a legal certificate for civil union in the state of Vermont.169 Her
ex-husband filed a motion for contempt, claiming that Susan violated the visitation
order "while cohabitating with her female lover."' 171 Susan claimed that the denial
of her visitation rights violated equal protection. The Georgia Court of Appeals held
that a civil union is not a marriage and that it would not give full faith and credit to
the same-sex unions and marriages of other states. 171 The court additionally noted
that its decision was rationally related to the public policy of Georgia, which
recognizes only the union of one172man and one woman and prohibits marriages
between persons of the same sex.
In contrast, in Loving v. Virginia,173 the Supreme Court recognized marriage as
a fundamental right, one which "has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.",174 And
while the fundamental right determination flowed from the racial implications of
Loving, which distinguishes it from cases involving same-sex marriage, 17'the Court
made it clear that state police powers regulating marriage are not unlimited and must
76
comport with the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In choosing to deny same-sex couples the fundamental right to marry, 177 as well
as the legal protections and benefits secured by all heterosexual couples in
matrimony and other forms of legalized unions, courts reinforce the value that same-

166. See, e.g., Buns v. Buns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 48.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at48-49.
172. Id. at 49. The court quoted the Georgia Code, which states that "[n]o marriage between persons of the
same sex shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the
same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or otherwise shall be void
in this state." GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(b) (2004).
173. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
174. Id. at 12.
175. See, e.g., Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 977-79 (Wash. 2006) (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11)
(distinguishing Loving by its history and tradition because, by the time the Court struck down anti-miscegenation
statutes, the majority of this nation's states had legally accepted interracial marriage); see Hernandez v. Robles, No.
5239, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1836, at *10 (July 6, 2006) (noting that the history behind Loving distinguished it from
the struggle for same-sex marriage because the country has long recognized the evils of racism and even "fought
a civil war to eliminate racism's worst manifestation, slavery, and passed three constitutional amendments to
eliminate that curse and its vestiges" (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11)).
176. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7.
177. See, e.g., Andersen, 138 P.3d at 977-79 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 11) (holding that there was no history
or tradition of same-sex marriage in this nation, but rather a bulk of law against it, and until "community
standards.. show a societal commitment to inclusion of same-sex marriage as part of the fundamental right to
marry," the Washington court will not deem it a fundamental right). The Washington court went on to note the
similar history of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003), stating that, by the time the Court ruled that
criminal sodomy statutes were an unconstitutional due process violation, only four states prohibited homosexual
sodomy, and these laws were rarely, if ever, enforced. Anderson, 138 P.3d at 977 n.9.Under this rationale, laws that
deny same-sex marriage rights cannot be overturned so long as a majority of states have and enforce such laws.
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sex relationships are inferior and undeserving of equal protection under the law.'78
Romer is consistently relied upon to support and maintain the gay community's
inferior status.' 79 In Bailey v. City of Austin,'80 the Texas appellate court held that
under rational basis review the city of Austin's reformed government benefits
package, which denied dependent coverage to all but married couples and children,
did not violate the state's equal protection guarantees. 8 ' Citing Romer, the court
held that the city's government package served the legitimate interest of
"recognizing and favoring legally cognizable relationships such as marriage."' 82
In addition, under Romer courts have yet to uphold the joint tax and bankruptcy
filings of same-sex couples who have entered into long-term civil unions, as well as
the legal same-sex marriages of other countries.' 83 In In re Kandu,' the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Washington relied on Romer in its decision that the debt of
one member of a gay couple cannot attach itself to the other and that the U.S.
government does not recognize legal marriages entered into between gay individuals
on foreign soil.8 5 In re Kandu involved two lesbian U.S. citizens, Lee and Ann
Kandu, who entered into a legal marriage in British Colombia, Canada on August
11, 2003.186 On October 31, 2003, Lee Kandu filed for bankruptcy protection under
Title 11, Chapter 7 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and listed Ann as a joint
debtor. 8 7 On December 5, 2003, the court determined that this was an improper
joint filing and demanded that Lee show cause. 88 On March 25, 2004, Ann died. 8 9
In addition to arguing that the court had a duty of comity to recognize foreign
marriages, which the court quickly rejected,'9g Lee relied on Romer to advance her

178. See Hernandez, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1836, at *11. The court acknowledged the "serious injustice in the
treatment of homosexuals" but seemed to defer its obligation to end this injustice until it compares to Civil War and
civil rights era racism. Id. As the idea of same-sex marriage is recent, the court stated that it should not "lightly
conclude that everyone who held this belief [against same-sex marriage] was irrational, ignorant or bigoted." Id.
179. See, e.g., Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180, 189-90 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); see also infra notes
180-182 and accompanying text.
180. 972 S.W.2d 180.
181. Id. at 189.
182. Id. at 189-90.
183. See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that under Romer the court did
not have to give comity to a Canadian same-sex marriage and the bankruptcy code did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause in its denial of the right of a same-sex couple to jointly file for bankruptcy); cf. In re Goodale,
298 B.R. 886 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2003) (holding that a lien could not attach to a former same-sex partner of
eighteen years to whom a Chapter 7 debtor was indebted because the partner did not qualify as a "spouse" or
"former spouse" within the meaning of the bankruptcy statute); In re Allen, 186 B.R. 769, 773 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1995) (holding that, under the Federal Bankruptcy Code, two gay men who had exchanged marriage vows before
a Baptist minister could not jointly file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection because the state did not recognize
the marriage).
184. 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
185. Id. at 147-48.
186. Id. at 130.
187. Id. The Federal Bankruptcy Code provides that "[a] joint case under a chapter of this title is commenced
by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a single petition under such chapter by an individual that may be a debtor
under such chapter and such individual's spouse." II U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
188. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 130.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 133 (stating that the U.S. "Supreme Court has concluded, in the event of a conflict of laws between
nations, a court must prefer the laws of its own nation"); see also Hennefeld v. Township of Montclair, 22 N.J. Tax
166, 178 (N.J. Tax Ct. 2005) (stating that, in regard to the recognition of a marriage license issued by Canada to
two gay men who are U.S. citizens, comity is "neither a matter of absolute obligation.. .nor of mere courtesy and
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arguments that DOMA violates her constitutional guarantees of equal protection and
due process. 9 ' Applying its interpretation of Romer, the court stated that, "[i]f a law
neither burdens a fundamental right, nor targets a suspect class, the Supreme Court
'will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to
some legitimate' governmental end."' 92 According to the court, under a rational
basis review, "DOMA does not burden a fundamental right nor target a suspected
class."' 193 Distinguishing DOMA from Colorado's Amendment 2, the court stated
that, whereas Amendment 2's breadth imposed "'a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group,"" 94 DOMA "simply codified that definition of
marriage historically understood by society."' 95
The lesson of these opinions is that lower courts consistently fail to read Romer
in its entirety. Romer neither held nor bound lower courts to rational basis review
of legislation that negatively impacts the rights of gay individuals. 19 6 Yet, each of
these cases cite Romer as the U.S. Supreme Court's decision that legislative
classifications on the basis of sexual orientation are subject to rational basis review.
With this incomplete reading of Romer, it is seemingly impossible to overturn state
and federal action designed to deny members of the gay community the ability to
marry and the ability to receive the legal benefits of marriage. At least one court has
attempted to use the "Romer stands for rational basis review of anti-gay legislation"
approach to overturn a state's DOMA amendment, but this approach was quickly
overturned. 97
2. Romer's Near Success: Nebraska's DOMA Amendment Temporarily
Overturned
Romer's "rational-basis analysis" brought temporary success in overturning at
least one state DOMA. In Citizens for Equal Protection,Inc. v. Bruning,'98 a U.S.
District Court in Nebraska used Romer to hold unconstitutional Nebraska's
DOMA.' 99 The case focused on article 1, Section 29 of the Nebraska Constitution, 200
which was passed by voters through
a ballot initiative on November 7, 2000, and
20
signed into law one month later. '
In Citizensfor Equal Protection,the plaintiffs petitioned the court to permanently
enjoin Section 29, arguing that, like Colorado's Amendment 2, the amendment
denies all members of the gay community "an equal opportunity to convince

good will....Comity is voluntary").

191. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 137-38.
192. Id. at 144 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 147 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
195. Id. at 148.
196. See supra Part 1.D.
197. See infra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
198. 368 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Neb. 2005), rev'd, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006), reh'g and reh'g en banc
denied, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22372 (Aug. 30, 2006).
199. Id. at 985, 994.
200. NEB. CON ST. art. I, § 29 (stating that "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman shall be valid or
recognized in Nebraska" and that "[t]he uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic
partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska").
201. Bruning, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 987.
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members of the Nebraska Unicameral [Legislature] that same-sex relationships
deserve some of the legal protections afforded to other relationships." 2° 2 The district
court agreed.2" 3
In its decision, the district court used Romer's "rational basis analysis" to hold
that, as defendants could not "justify the amendment under deferential 'rational
2
basis' review, the court need not discuss the more stringent level of scrutiny. 1
Analogizing to Amendment 2, the district court found that Section 29 caused clear
harm by depriving the gay community of equal protections "'taken for granted by
most.' 20 5 By disallowing the gay community's political ability to effectuate change,
Section 29 imposed an impermissible legal disability upon them.2' 6 This harm,
according to the district court, bore no "rational relation to some legitimate end," 2°
was status-based (designed against a specific class of individuals), 2 8 and was fueled
by animus toward that class. 2°9 Quoting Romer, the court noted that "[a] State cannot
so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws."'2 °
In July 2006, the Eighth Circuit overruled the district court, holding that, unlike
Colorado's Amendment 2, Section 29 served a legitimate state interest in promoting
procreation "within the socially recognized unit that is best situated for raising
children. 2 1 ' In reaching this decision, the Eighth Circuit inferred that denying
members of the gay community the ability to marry is no different than denying
thirteen year olds the right to marry, denying polygamy, or requiring the passage of
a venereal disease exam before marriage.2 12 In conclusion, the court highlighted the
need for heightened constitutional scrutiny of a law that denies members of the gay
community equal protection under the law: "If there is no constitutional right to
same-sex marriage... [a state amendment that denies members of the gay community
the ability to marry] survives rational basis review. 2 3 As courts increasingly deny
and persist in their unwillingness to provide members of the gay community the
equal protection afforded all heterosexual citizens, the need for heightened scrutiny
becomes only more apparent.

202. Id. at 984.

203. Id.
204. Id. at 989.
205. Id. at 994-95 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996)); see also id. at 1004 (finding
"Section 29 inflicts 'immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications
may be claimed for it' (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635)).
206. Id. at 992 (stating that "the possible ability of a group or association to pursue goals by other means
not significantly ameliorate the disabilities imposed by a restraint on freedom of association" (citing Romer,

that
that
will
517

U.S. at 631)).
207. Id. at 994-95 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32).
208. Id. at 1002 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).
209. Id. (citing Amar, supra note 3, at 220).
210. Id. (quoting Rorer,517 U.S. at 635). The district court also recognized the economic impact that Section
29 would have on same-sex families as the denial of the ability to enter legalized unions potentially impacted other
benefits associated with marriage, including insurance contracts, adoption contracts, estate planning, and business
agreements. Id. at 1003-05 (citing Jill Schachner Chanen, Marriage Law Could Reach Contracts, A.B.A. J. EREPORT, July 16, 2004; Christopher Rizzo, Banning State Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships: Constitutional
Implicationsof Nebraska's Initiative 416, 11 J.L. & POL'Y 1, 57-58 (2002)).
211. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859,867 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id. (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 414 U.S. 374, 392 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
213. Id. at 871.
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3. Adoption Rights: Romer's (In)Ability to Overturn Discriminatory
Parenting Legislation
Not only has a narrow reading of Romer failed to provide marriage and domestic
partnership protections, it has also failed, with few exceptions, 1 4 to provide
otherwise qualified gay individuals the ability to adopt or foster parent a child.2" 5
Research shows that children raised by same-sex couples fare no differently than
those raised by heterosexual couples.216 Gay parents are just like all other parents,
with the same strengths and foibles. 1 7 Yet, as evidenced by the Indiana legislature's
recent attempt to pass a bill that would prohibit gays, lesbians, and unmarried people
from using medical science to assist them in having a baby, 218 much of society
continues to believe that people who are gay are not suitable parents and that the
citizenry of this country has the right to stop them from having children. The Indiana
bill, if passed, would have required doctors to investigate the education and
employment histories, criminal backgrounds, family plans, and the marital status of
each person who sought that doctor's assistance. 2 19 Fortunately for members of the
gay and single community wishing to have a baby, the bill was dropped in
committee when the sponsor of the bill, state Republican Senator Patricia Miller,
realized that "the issue was more complex than anticipated. 2 2 °
As to same-sex adoption laws, only two states--California and Vermont-permit
same-sex adoption by statute.22' The courts of other states, including New Mexico,222
have determined that, under their state's adoption statutes, same-sex adoption is not
prohibited and sexual orientation is not dispositive in the determination of whether
the adoption is in the best interests of the child. 223 Alternatively, courts in four
states--Colorado, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin-have disallowed same-sex
second-parent or stepparent adoption, holding that these adoptions are not in the best
interest of the child. 224 The statutes of Michigan, Mississippi, and Utah prohibit both

214. See, e.g., infra notes 243-248.
215. See supranotes 169-174 and accompanying text; see infra notes 230-244 and accompanying text.
216. Linda Little, Study: Same-Sex Parents Raise Well-Adjusted Kids, Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.webmd.
com/content/Article/i 13/110762.htm (finding that the one to six million children in the United States that are raised
by gay and lesbian parents are virtually the same in every way as children raised by heterosexual couples); contra
PAUL CAMERON & KIRK CAMERON, CHILDREN OF HOMOsExuAL PARENTS REPORT CHILDHOOD DIFFICULTIES

(2002), http://www.familyresearchinst.org/FRhomokids.html (summarizing narratives of problems related by
children of gay and lesbian parenting).
217. See generally Charlotte J.Patterson, Adoption of Minor Children by Lesbian and Gay Adults: A Social
Science Perspective, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 196-205 (1995) (summarizing social science research
about the development of children with lesbian and gay parents).
218. Bill Limiting ProcreationAssistance Abandoned, J. GAZETTE (Ft. Wayne, Ind.), Oct. 6, 2005, at At.
219. Associated Press, Indiana Bill Would Limit Reproduction Proceduresfor Gays, Singles, Oct. 5, 2005,
available at http://hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=29219&TEMPLATE=/Content
Management/ContentDisplay.cfm.
220. Bill Limiting ProcreationAssistance Abandoned, supranote 218, atAl.
221. CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9000(b) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (2002).
222. See A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 585, 829 P.2d 660, 664 (Ct. App. 1992). For a full discussion of New
Mexico's status within this legal discussion, see infra Part IV.
223. See, e.g., In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (M].App. Ct. 1995); In re K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253 (Ind.Ct. App.
2004); In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re Two Children, 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995); In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).
224. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, SECOND-PARENT/STEPPARENT ADOPTION LAWS IN THE U.S. (2006),
available at http://www.hrc.orgtTemplate.cfm?Section=About-HRC&Template--/ContentManagement/Content
Display.cfm&ContentlD= 16302.
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unmarried and same-sex couples from adopting, while Florida's statutes explicitly
forbid adoptions by gay individuals. 225 This year, sixteen states will vote on ballot
226
initiatives aimed at denying the ability of gay individuals and couples to adopt.
a. Same-Sex Adoption and Foster Parenting Challenges Since Romer
i. In re the Adoption of T.K.J. 227
In 1996, the Colorado Court of Appeals interpreted Romer's rational basis
standard of review to uphold Colorado's adoption law, 228 which allows a secondparent to adopt only when he or she is married to the child's natural parent. 229The
230
petitioners in In re the Adoption of T.K.J. lived together as domestic partners.
Each was the natural parent of one child, and each sought to second-parent adopt the
other child. 231 The trial court held that, under Colorado's statute, the children would
be available for adoption only if the couple were married or if each relinquished her
natural parent-child relationship.232 These petitioners challenged Colorado's
statute.233 In addition to holding that the statute did not deny due process, the
Colorado Court of Appeals cited Romer to determine that rational basis was the
appropriate equal protection scrutiny level. 234 As the statute's "disparate treatment"

is rationally related to "promoting the best interests of children and familial
stability," the court held that the statute did not violate the children's rights to equal
protection. 231
236

ii. Lofton v. Secretaryof the Departmentof Children & Family Services
In 2004, the Eleventh Circuit relied on Romer to uphold Florida's anti-gay
adoption statute in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family
Services.237 The court first used Romer to determine that rational basis was the
appropriate standard of review as the statute did not burden a fundamental right and
members of the gay community were not a protected class.238 "Under this deferential

225. See HuMAN RIGHrTs CAMPAIGN, ADOPTION AND FOSTER CARE LAws AND POLICIES (2006), available

at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=AboutHRC&Template=/ContentManagementlContentDisplay.cfm
&ContentlD=16302.
226. See Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Adoption Heat Up in 16 States, USA TODAY, Feb. 21, 2006, at
A l (arguing that this multi-state effort to ban gays and lesbians from adopting is the next front in the culture wars
that began in 2004 with the highly successful push to pass DOMA amendments and statutes).
227. 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
228. Id. at 495.
229. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-5-200.2 to -216 (2005).
230. Adoption of T.K.J., 931 P.2d at 490.
231. Id.
232. Id. at491.
233. id. at 494. The petitioners also challenged the court's construction of the statute. Id. at 492-93.
234. Id. at 495 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
235. Id. at 496. The court additionally stated that, while "[n]atural parents have a fundamental liberty interest
in the care, custody, and management of their children[,]... we find no indication of such an interest regarding the
relationship between a child and a potential adoptive parent." Id. at 494 (citations omitted).
236. 358 F.3d 804 (1lth Cir. 2004).
237. Id. at 806, 818.

238. Id. at 818 (stating that, "[u]nless the challenged classification burdens a fundamental right or targets a
suspect class, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest" (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 631)).
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standard, a legislative classification 'is accorded a strong presumption of validity'
and 'must be upheld against [an] equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.' ' 239 Directly quoting Romer, the court stated that rational basis
validates government action "'even if the law seems unwise or works to 'the
24
disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous. 0
Rejecting an analogy to Colorado's Amendment 2, the court stated that, whereas
"Amendment 2's classification encompassed both conduct and status[,].. .Florida's
adoption prohibition is limited to conduct....Thus, we conclude that Romer's unique
factual situation and narrow holding are inapposite to this case."24 1
iii. Romer's Success in Overturning Anti-Gay Adoption and
Foster Parenting Regulations
While the summer of 2006 brought numerous judicial decisions that further
secured denial of marriage rights,242 it also brought at least two decisions that
protected the adoption and foster parenting rights of members of the gay
community.2 43 In 2004, Oklahoma amended its adoption statute to state that, while
the foreign adoptions of other states are generally honored, "this state, any of its
agencies, or any court of this state shallnot recognize an adoption by more than one
individual of the same sex from any other state orforeignjurisdiction.'' 244 In May,

2006, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held that the
amendment violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause.245 In addition, by declaring
them illegitimate upon their entrance to the state, the court held that the amendment
violated the adopted children's equal protection guarantees. 246 Citing Romer, the
court additionally held that the amendment violated the same-sex parents' equal
protection guarantees because it "targets an unpopular group and singles them out
for disparate treatment., 247 In so doing, the court found not legitimate the state's
asserted interest in "halt[ing] the erosion of the mainstream definition of the family
unit and.. .protect[ing] Oklahoma children from being targeted for adoption by gay
groups across the nation and...ensur[ing] that children are raised in traditional
family environments.""2 4
While the court in Finstuendid not discuss this issue, the Oklahoma amendment
also violated the requirements of the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA). 249 Although federal DOMA legislation permits states to deny full faith and
credit recognition of another state's marriage decree, the PKPA states that full faith
239. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993)).
240. Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
241. Id. at 827 (citations omitted).
242. See supranotes 139-152, 211-213 and accompanying text; infra notes 261-272 and accompanying text.
243. Finstuen v. Edmondson, No. CIV-04-1152-C, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32122 (W.D. Okla. May 19, 2006);
Dep't of Human Servs. v. Howard, No. 05-814, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 418 (Ark. June 29, 2006).
244. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 7502-1.4(A) (West Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).
245. Finstuen, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32122, at *22-37.

246. Id. at *31.
247. Id. at *36.
248. Id. at *36-37. According to the court, this rationale demonstrates that the law was intended to target and
harm an unpopular group, which is not a legitimate rationale. Id. at *37.
249. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
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and credit must be given to the child custodial decrees of another state."' As a
result, even in those states with amended constitutions that deny same-sex marriage
and the recognition thereof, courts have been forced to uphold the same-sex
adoptions of other states." I In 2000, Mississippi attempted to pass legislation similar
to Oklahoma's but recognized that, under the PKPA and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the proposed legislation was invalid. 252 It is fortunate for members of the gay
community who wish to adopt, and for those who have already jumped many
hurdles to adopt, that the Oklahoma amendment failed, as it could have made the
hurdles of adoption insurmountable.
At issue in Department of Human Services & Child Welfare Agency Review
Boardv. Howardwas an Arkansas Child Welfare Agency Review Board regulation
that denied the ability to foster parent to those engaged in homosexual activities, as
well as to those who lived with a homosexual. z 3 In overturning the regulation, the
Arkansas Supreme Court relied heavily on the lower court's memorandum opinion,
which upheld the regulations under its reading of Romer's rational basis analysis. 254
The lower court upheld the regulations reluctantly,"25 as highly persuasive expert
testimony
demonstrated that sexual orientation does not influence parenting
256
ability.

In review of the lower court opinion, the state supreme court held the regulations
to be invalid under the separation of powers doctrine"27 and declined to review the
regulation's equal protection implications.258 However, the concurrence took the
opportunity to state that "[t]here is no question but that gay and lesbian couples have

250. Id. For a more detailed discussion of how the Oklahoma statute violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the PKPA, see Robert G. Spector, The Unconstitutionalityof Oklahoma's Statute Denying Recognition to
Adoptions by Same-Sex Couplesfrom Other States, 40 TULSA L REv. 467 (2005).
251. See generally Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be Recognized by Sister
States Underthe Full Faith and CreditClauseDespiteAnti-MarriageStatutes That DiscriminateAgainst Same-Sex
Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 751 (2003); Nancy D. Polikoff, Recognizing Partnersbut Not Parents/Recognizing
Parentsbut Not Partners:Gay and Lesbian Family Law in Europe and the UnitedStates, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTS. 711 (2000).
252. Polikoff, supra note 251, at 735 (discussing Mississippi House Bill 49, which was introduced on January
12, 2000, but died on calendar March 16, 2000).
253. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Howard, No. 05-814, 2006 Ark. LEXIS 418, at *2-3, * 13-16 (June 29, 2006)
(discussing the lower court's finding that sexual orientation in no way impacts foster parenting ability).
254. Id. at *3-4, *12-16 (citing Howard v. Child Welfare Agency Rev. Bd., No. CV 1999-9881, 2004 WL
3154530, *10-12 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 2004)) (accepting the state's asserted interest in "public morality" and
holding that, because members of the gay community do not qualify as a suspect class, because there is no judicial
precedent for heightened scrutiny, and because foster parenting does not qualify as a fundamental right, it could not,
under Romer, overturn the regulation).
255. Howard, 2004 WL 3154530, at *11-13. The lower court additionally proclaimed that "[t]he
'confrontation' in this case has presented us all with an excellent opportunity to replace ignorance with knowledge
and to make an informed decision based on information as opposed to assumption." Id. at * 13.
256. Id. at *3-8. Also influential was the fact that no court has yet to hold that members of the gay community
qualify as a suspect class. Id. at *10.
257. Howard, 2006 Ark LEXIS 418, at *17-18 (holding the regulation a separation of powers violation
because the legislature did not delegate to the Board the authority to regulate or promote morality and the "driving
force behind adoption of the regulation was.. .the Board's views of morality and its bias against homosexuals").
258. Id. at * 19 ("As we have held that [the regulation] is unconstitutional on the basis of separation of powers,
we will not address the other constitutional arguments raised by Appellees on cross-appeal because to do so would
amount to an advisory opinion.").
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legitimate and
had their equal-protection and privacy rights truncated without any
'
rational basis in the form of foster-child protection for doing so. 259
4. The Irrationality of Rational Basis Review Revealed
In addition to rulings issued by the Eighth Circuit and the Washington Supreme
Court, 2" New York's highest court used the summer of 2006 to hold that rational
basis review is the appropriate tier of scrutiny for laws that classify on the basis of
sexual orientation and that the legalized denial of same-sex marriage survives this
review.26 ' While New York is one of the few remaining states without legislative
language defining marriage as between a man and a woman, 26 2 the court held that
the state's marriage statute "clearly limits" marriage to heterosexual couples 263 and
that this limit is rationally related to the state's legitimate interest in fostering the
stability of opposite sex households.26
The New York decision highlights not only the irrationality that rational basis
review permits, but also the injustice perpetuated through its application. In its
determination that the legislative denial of same-sex marriage was rationally related
to the state's interests in promoting familial stability,265 the court acknowledged both
the "serious injustice" faced by members of the gay community, 266 as well as the
"undisputed" and numerous benefits of marriage.2 7 In defining aspects of familial
stability, the court stated that same-sex couples, because they "do not become
parents as a result of accident or impulse,, 268 provide inherently more stable
households than opposite sex households, as "relationships between people of the
opposite sex present a greater danger that children will be born into or grow up in
unstable homes. 269 Without factual backing, the court assumed that heterosexual
couples need the protections of marriage more than same-sex couples because,
unlike heterosexual couples, same-sex couples must make the conscious choice,
either through artificial insemination or adoption, to have a child.27 ° Thus, the logic
flows that, because children of same-sex families are born into more stable

259. Id. at *26-27 (Brown, J., concurring). The concurrence further noted that the majority erred in not
striking down the regulation on equal protection and privacy grounds as the "Board's proffered reasons surrounding
best interest of the child are gossamer thin and have no foundation in objective reason." Id. at *27.
260. Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006); Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d

963 (Wash. 2006).
261. Hernandez v. Robles, No. 5239, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1836 (July 6, 2006).
262. See supra note 134.
263. Hernandez, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1836, at *2-3 (holding that, although the state's marriage law does not
expressly state "that only people of different sexes may marry each other," heterosexual provisions and references
within the law "clearly limits" marriage to heterosexual couples).
264. Id. at *6-11.
265. Id. (discussing how the legislature could decide that marriage is rationally related to children's security,
that it is better for children to be raised in the presence of a mother and father, and that children fare better with

parents of the opposite sex).
266. Id. at *11 (stating that, in spite of this injustice, "the traditional definition of marriage is not merely a
by-product of historical injustice" and "[i]ts history is of a different kind").

267. Id. at *5 (noting that, beyond the 316 identified benefits under New York's marriage law, including tax
incentives, probate and intestacy rights, divorce rights, and insurance and medical rights, marriage confers upon
couples "the symbolic benefit, or moral satisfaction, of seeing their relationships recognized by the State").

268. Id. at *7.
269. Id.
270. Id.

Summer 2006]

IRRATIONAL LEGACY OF ROMER V. EVANS

environments, in part because of biology and in part because their parents are not
allowed to marry, their same-sex parents do not need the protections and benefits of
state-recognized marriage.7' Further highlighting the illogical reasoning perpetrated
by New York's rational basis review, the court, after assuming that same-sex
households are more stable, refused to accept the plaintiffs' factual offerings
demonstrating that the children of same-sex parents fare no differently than those
of opposite sex parents and deemed these factual offerings as assumptions unacceptable to the court.272
Although a core constitutional foundation envisioned by the Framers was the
protection of minority groups from the tyranny of the masses,27 3 the New York
decision highlights how rational basis review provides for majority tyranny guised
in the form of respect for democracy. 274 As this democracy demonstrates increased
disrespect and contempt for the gay community, rational basis review ensures that
members of the gay community remain subject to the oppression of a democratically
based tyranny.
Lastly, while the New York opinion is useful to demonstrate the lack of logic
perpetuated by rational basis review, it also offers a glimpse of Romer' s unrealized
potential. While the majority never cited to Romer, the dissent demonstrates how
Romer could be used to further, rather than deny, equal protection guarantees. First,
the dissent relies on Romer to state that, under rational basis review, the legitimate
interest must rationally relate to the denial and that, as a denial of marriage to samesex couples fails to promote the interest of heterosexual family stability, the denial
fails rational basis review and reveals the actual interest of promoting
discrimination.275 Citing Romer again, the dissent then declares, "[tihe breadth of
protections that the marriage laws make unavailable to gays and lesbians is 'so far
removed' from the State's asserted goal of promoting procreation that the
justification is, again, 'impossible to credit."' 2 76 Finally, under Romer, the dissent
noted that the problem with reliance upon tradition as the existence of tradition only
demonstrates that the "discrimination has existed for a long277time. A classification,
however, cannot be maintained merely 'for its own sake.' ,
If the time has not come for a heightened form of equal protection scrutiny for
members of the gay community, perhaps the time has come for the U.S. Supreme
Court to clarify what it actually stated and held in Romer. In the alternative, it would
also be helpful for the Court to declare that the values of procreation and familial

271. Id.
272. Id. at *8-9 (refusing the plaintiffs' offered evidence because it failed to demonstrate "beyond doubt that
children fare equally well in same-sex and opposite-sex households").
273. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see generally LANt
GuuAER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrrY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS tN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRAcY (1994).

274. Hernandez, 2006 N.Y. LEXIS 1836, at *22 (concluding that, although "future generations" may decide
that same-sex marriage is right, "the present generation should have a chance to decide the issue through its elected
representatives").
275. Id. at *77 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 633); see also id. at *85 ("[C]lassifications
'drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law' can never be legitimate." (quoting Romer,
517 U.S. at 633)).
276. Id. at *81-82 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635).

277. Id. at *86 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 635). The dissent concludes that "the justification of 'tradition'
does not explain the classification; it merely repeats it." Id. at *87.
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stability have nothing to do with the prejudice contained in laws designed to deny
members of the gay community equal protection under the law.
IV. ANALYSIS: IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW MEXICO AND THE CASE FOR
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY FOR NEW MEXICO'S GAY COMMUNITY
After ten years, Romer's results are apparent. Case law consistently claims that
Romer stands for a rational basis review of law that discriminates on the basis of
sexual orientation.278 Furthermore, only one case refers to Romer's secondary
holding, that state actions that are so broad as to deny political redress to the gay
community are an outright violation of the Equal Protection Clause.279 Perhaps with
only one exception, 280 courts that rely on this incomplete reading of Romer have
used it to uphold classifications that unfairly discriminate against individuals who
are gay. As a result, Romer has (1) not succeeded in overturning legislation and
amendments directed at marginalizing the gay community, (2) been unsuccessful in
overturning legislation that negatively impacts the gay community, and (3) failed
to provide the gay community equal protection under the law. Either the time has
come for the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify its position in Romer, or, as rational
basis has proven inadequate, it is time for a more heightened form of scrutiny.
What this means for New Mexico is uncertain. Only two New Mexico cases have
cited to Romer.28 1 In neither case were issues related to the differential treatment of
the gay community in dispute. 82 As such, New Mexico's courts have yet to address
which scrutiny level best applies to legislation that classifies on the basis of sexual
orientation. New Mexico, however, has a legal history of protecting and expanding
the rights of members of the gay community.283 Furthermore, New Mexico's
accepted version of equal protection analysis recognizes a higher form of rational
basis review, one that requires the government to assert a rationale that is actually
reflected in state law. 284 As a result, if New Mexico courts are faced with a situation
in which the equal protection rights of members of the gay community are at issue,
the challenge may not survive rational basis review as the state will have a difficult
time meeting its burden of showing how this differential treatment is rationally
related to any legitimate government interest.285 Alternatively, recent New Mexico
case law demonstrates that, even if the federal government does not heighten its
equal protection scrutiny for certain classes of individuals, New Mexico may.286

278. See supra Part II.
279. See supra notes 85-93, 102 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 149.
281. Wagner v. AGW Consultants, 2005-NMSC-016,1 41, 114 P.3d 1050, 1063 (Bosson, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (complaining about the confusion of the U.S. Supreme Court's rational basis analysis
in Romer); State v. Druktenis, 2004-NMCA-032,
constitutionality of a sex offender registration law).
282. See infra Part IV.B.
283. See infra Part I.B.
284. See infra Part W.A.
285. See infra Part IV.C.
286. See infra Part V.D.

TI 94,

102, 86 P.3d 1050, 1078, 1080 (analyzing the
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A. New Mexico's Tiers of Equal ProtectionScrutiny

New Mexico's equal protection clause states that "[n]o person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall any person be
denied equal protection of the laws. 287 In most respects, New Mexico's approach
to equal protection review reflects the federal model. 288 However, in 1998, the New
Mexico Supreme Court clarified its approach to rational basis review and declared
that, under New Mexico jurisprudence, rational basis review requires the
government to assert an actual legitimate basis, one that is founded in either fact or
law.289 In announcing New Mexico's new rational basis test, the court stated that this
test is neither a "virtual rubber-stamp" 29° nor "toothless. ' '291 Unlike its federal
counterpart, rational basis review in New Mexico does not "preordain[] the result
by applying no real scrutiny., 292 As a result, New Mexico's rational basis review is
the heightened form discussed by Justice Marshall in City of Cleburne2 93 but rejected
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Heller v. Doe.2 4 In analyzing an equal protection
claim under New Mexico's rational basis review, the issue before the court will be
whether the government interest in treating a class of similarly situated individuals
is rationally related to actual legitimate interests that can be fairly traced in fact or
law. If New Mexico courts decide that an equal protection claim brought by a
member or members of the gay community is deserving of rational basis review, the
government will have to assert a reason based in actual policy or law to legitimize
its differential treatment of the gay community. As New Mexico law and policy is
replete with examples of providing more, rather than less, protection for the gay
community, 295 it will be difficult for any branch of New Mexico government to
convince the court that its differential treatment of the gay community is rationally
related to any actual law or policy.
B. Evidence of New Mexico's CurrentLaw and Policy Toward the Gay
Community
For over thirty years, New Mexico's political and jurisprudential history reveals
a commitment to provide members of the gay community with equal protection
under the law. In 1973, New Mexico Senate Bill 322, codified in 1975, abolished
the law that made sodomy and sexual acts between consenting adults a criminal
violation.29 6 The legislation, sponsored by Democrat Senator Thomas Rutherford
and Republican Representative Paul Brecht, was issued over twenty years before the
287. N.M. CONST. art. I1, § 18.
288. See supraPart II.A.
289. Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 31, 965 P.2d 305, 314; see also Alvarez v. Chavez,
118 N.M. 732, 740, 886 P.2d 461, 469 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that, to survive rational basis review, the court
"must be persuaded that there is an adequate basis in fact or law for the challenged classifications"). Trujillo rejected
the heightened rational basis test of Alvarez and instead found that the heightened Alvarez standard was subsumed
by its clarified approach. Trujillo, 1998-NMSC-031, 32, 965 P.2d at 314.
30, 965 P.2d at 314.
290. Trujillo, 1998-NMSC-031,
291. Id.
292. Id. (citations omitted).
293. See supranotes 33-34 and accompanying text.
294. See supranote 36.
295. See infra Part W.B.
296. NMSA 1978, § 30-9-11 (1975).
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U.S. Supreme
Court held criminal sodomy statutes unconstitutional in Lawrence v.
29 7

Texas.
The New Mexico Human Rights Act 298 was amended in 2003 to include a
prohibition against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
gender identity.299 This enactment made New Mexico the fourth state to ban
discrimination based on gender identity," one of sixteen states to ban employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in both the public and private
sector,3 °1 and one of eleven to offer state employees domestic partner benefits.3 2
Several governmental entities, local municipalities, and school districts, including
the State of New Mexico, Albuquerque Public Schools, the City of Las Cruces, the
Los Alamos School District, and the Santa Fe School Board, offer these same
domestic partnership benefits.30 3
In 1992, New Mexico became one of the first states to hold that under New
Mexico adoption law3" the sexual orientation of a parent would not be a
determinative factor barring second-parent adoption. 30 5 In making its decision, the
court relied on New Mexico precedent, which indicated that sexual orientation is not
dispositive in the determination of whether a parent is fit for custodial rights. 30 6 New
Mexico courts will also hear and resolve cases involving the child custody disputes
30 7
of same-sex domestic partners.
New Mexico remains one of five states without some form of legislation defining
marriage as between a man and a woman.30 8 New Mexico's marriage law does not
mention gender, but defines marriage as a civil contract between contracting
parties. 309 This statute, in combination with the Equal Rights Act of 1973,"' ° which

297.
298.

539 U.S. 558 (2003).
NMSA 1978, § 28-1-7 (2004).

299. Human Rights Act, ch. 383, § 2, 2003 N.M. Laws 5.B.28.
300. Human Rights Campaign Found., supra note 112, at 34. For updated law concerning state and local
protection of individuals on the basis of gender identity, see HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, TRANSGENDER
AMERICANS: A HANDBOOK FOR UNDERSTANDING (2005), available at http://www.hrc.org/Template.cfm?Section=
AboutHRC&CONTENTID=29235&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagementContentDisplay.cfm, and Transgender
Law & Policy Institute, http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2006).
301. Human Rights Campaign Found., supra note 112, at 28.
302. Id. at 20.
303. Id. at 22-23.

304. NMSA 1978, § 32A-5-36(F) (2003) ("The court shall grant a decree of adoption if it finds that the
petitioner has proved by clear and convincing evidence that...the petitioner is a suitable adoptive parent and the best
interests of the adoptee are served by the adoption....").
305. A.C. v. C.B., 113 N.M. 581, 585, 829 P.2d 660, 664 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an adoption
petitioner's "sexual orientation, standing alone, is not a permissible basis for the denial of shared custody or
visitation").
306. Id. at 585, 829 P.2d at 664 (citing In re Jacinta M., 107 N.M. 769, 771-72, 764 P.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Ct.
App. 1988) (holding that the homosexual orientation of an elder brother was not dispositive in the determination
of the best interests of the child, and that "[d]isapproval of morals or other personal characteristics cannot be used
to determine the fitness of a person to care for a child")).
307. Bamae v. Bamae, 1997-NMCA-077, 943 P.2d 1036.
308. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
309. NMSA 1978, § 40-1-1 (1953) (defining marriage as a "civil contract, for which the consent of the
contracting parties, capable in law of contracting, is essential"). For a history of New Mexico's marriage law, see
In re Gabaldon's Estate, 38 N.M. 392, 34 P.2d 672 (1934).
310. N.M. CONST. art. 11,§ 18.
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outlaws discrimination on the basis of sex, leaves open the question of whether,
under New Mexico law, the state already implicitly allows for same-sex marriage.3 '
C. Rational Basis Review Applied in New Mexico
As a result of New Mexico's established policy and law to protect the gay
community from discrimination and to provide the gay community with equal rights
and opportunities under the law, a law suffering a judicial challenge by a gay
individual or same-sex couple may not survive rational basis review. To convince
the court that its differential treatment of the gay community is rationally related to
any actual law or policy, the government must be able to proffer actual evidence of
law or policy to justify such differential treatment. 1 2 Unlike the gay individual or
same-sex couple in any of the states that prohibit same-sex adoption by members of
the gay community, 313 legally define marriage as between a man and a woman, 3 ' 4 or
fail to provide protection from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 31 5
New Mexico is without law or policy to demonstrate the state's commitment to
treating members of the gay community differently. 31 6 As such, the state can only
show a policy of legally endorsing and supporting the rights of the gay commun3 17
Without such demonstration, the government will have a difficult time meetity.
ing its burden and may not survive New Mexico's standard of rational basis review.
The court may take seriously the government's fiscal concerns as rationally relat31 8
ed to the government's decision to legally treat a class of individuals differently.
The raising of fiscal concerns, however, is not dispositive. 3 9 The government may

311. The issue of whether same-sex marriage is implicitly allowed under New Mexico law is exemplified by
the 2004 issuance of over sixty same-sex marriage licenses by Sandoval County Clerk Victoria Dunlap. Dunlap told
reporters that she was "not aware of anything that would prohibit issuing marriage licenses for same-sex couples."
See Joshua Akers, Sandoval to Allow Same-Sex Nuptials, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 20, 2004, at AI (Dunlap stated
that "[t]his has nothing to do with politics or morals. If there are no legal grounds that say this should be prohibited,
I can't withhold it... .This office won't say no until shown it's not permissible."); see also Steve Barnes, New
Mexico: Gay-Marriage Injunction Stands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2004, at A15; Christopher Lisotta, Bringing
Marriage to New Mexico, T'lHE ADVOCATE, July 6, 2004, at 20; Mariella Savidge, No, You Don't; Controversy
Continues to Build over the Right of Gay Couples to Wed, MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Mar. 9, 2004, at El.
Although State Attorney General Patricia Madrid issued an injunction against Dunlap to stop issuing the licenses,
the marriage licenses issued by Dunlap remain unchallenged in court. In the 2005 legislative session, the New
Mexico legislature successfully blocked DOMA legislation in both the House and the Senate. See H.R. 445, 47th
Leg., 2005 Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2005) (defining marriage as between a man and a woman); S. 597, 47th Leg., 2005
Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2005) (same).
312. See supra notes 291-296 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 223-228 and accompanying text.
314. See supra note 134.
315. Human Rights Campaign Found., supra note 112, at 28.
316. See supra Part IV.B.
317. See supra Part IV.B.
318. See Marrujo v. N.M. State Highway Transp. Dep't, 118 N.M. 753,760-61,887 P.2d 747,754-55 (1994)
(holding that under the New Mexico Torts Claim Act the state's asserted interest in protecting the public treasuries
are rationally related to legitimate government interest); Candelaria v. Gen. Elec. Co., 105 N.M. 167, 173-74, 730
P.2d 470,476-77 (Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing the importance of the government's fiscal concerns in the regulation
and implementation of the state's workers' compensation statutes), supersededby statute, NMSA 1978, § 52-1-24
(1990); Garcia v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 95 N.M. 391, 395, 622 P.2d 699, 703 (Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that under the New Mexico Torts Claim Act limiting the liability of public employees was rationally
related to the government's fiscal concerns).
319. See Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005-NMSC-028, 1 33-35, 120 P.3d 413, 424 (holding that the
government's asserted interest of avoiding additional workers' compensation costs was not an important interest);
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claim that providing full access to domestic partnership benefits or providing the
right to marry or enter some form of legally recognized civil union is too costly and
that not providing these rights and benefits is rationally related to the states' fiscal
concerns. However, given the State of New Mexico's willingness to provide its
employees with domestic partnership benefits,3 2 its interest in insuring its citizens,
and the economic benefits the state will gain by providing the right to legal same-sex
unions,3 2' this fiscal challenge is unlikely to prove persuasive.
If the court does side with the government under rational basis review, recent
New Mexico case law suggests that a more heightened form of scrutiny may be
required.322 Recent case law, coupled with New Mexico's equal protection analysis,
additionally suggests that New Mexico is prepared to provide a higher degree of
scrutiny to laws that differentially classify and treat members of its gay community
on the basis of their sexual orientation. 23
D. An Argument for IntermediateScrutinyfor New Mexico's Gay Community
While we take guidance from the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution and the federal courts' interpretation of it, we will nonetheless
interpret the New Mexico Constitution's Equal Protection Clause independently
when appropriate. 4
In Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, the New Mexico Supreme Court
articulated the way in which members of a class of individuals who are treated
differently from those who are similarly situated can prove to the court that a higher
degree of equal protection scrutiny is needed to ensure their equal protection under
the law.325 If the New Mexico Supreme Court decides that rational basis review is
not enough to strike down a law that treats members of the gay community
differently than other people, then the court, under Romer, has the freedom to decide
on a higher degree of scrutiny.326 Breen provides the foundation for a legal argument

Schirmer v. Homestake Mining Co., 118 N.M. 420, 423, 882 P.2d 11, 14 (1994) (holding that, under the state's
workers' compensation statute, the state's legitimate fiscal concerns were less important than the health risks faced
by employees); N.M. Taxation & Revenue Dep't v. Whitener, 117 N.M. 130, 133, 869 P.2d 829, 832 (Ct. App.
1993) (finding that the state's asserted interests in imposing taxes under the Controlled Substance Act were less
important than the rights of criminal defendants).
320. See supra notes 304-305.
321. See, e.g., Communities in Charge in CentralNew Mexico (2000), http://www.communitiesincharge
.org/Phase%200ne/Albet.htm (stating that New Mexico ranks last in the nation in the percentage of its population
between the ages of nineteen and sixty-four that is uninsured); Paying a Premium: The Increased Cost of Carefor
the Uninsured(2005), http://www.familiesusa.org/resources/publications/reports/paying-a-premium-findings.html
(stating that, by 2010, New Mexico will rank second only to Texas in its number of uninsured residents). Recent
research demonstrates the wealth the state will gain by providing same-sex couples the right to marry. See M.V. LEE
BADGEr, R. BRADLEY SEARS, STEVEN K. HOMER, PATRICE CuRTIs & ELISABErH KUKURA, THE IMPACT ON NEW

MExico's BUDGET OF ALLOWING SAME-SEX COUPLES TO MARRY (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.law.ucla.
edu/williamsinstitute/publications new%20mexico%20econ%20study.pdf.
322. See supraPart I.B.
323. See supraPart I.B.
324. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 1 14, 120 P.3d at 418.
325. Id.
326. This is true not only because Romer did not hold that laws implicating the rights of members of the gay
community are subject to rational basis review but also because states can constitutionally provide more protection
than the Federal Constitution. See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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that heightened scrutiny is required for legislation directed at limiting the rights of
homosexuals. 3 27 While Breen did not specifically address the legal issues that affect
the rights of gay individuals and couples, the legal argument articulated by the New
Mexico Supreme Court in Breen may prove helpful in an attempt to increase
32
scrutiny protection for members of New Mexico's gay community. If a member
of the gay community or a same-sex couple raises an equal protection challenge in
New Mexico, and if the challenge includes heightening scrutiny to the intermediate
level, the challengers will have to follow the test laid out in Breen.329 With over sixty
same-sex married couples in New Mexico, 33 it is likely that the challenge will be
about marriage rights but could also focus upon the denial of domestic partnership
benefits.
Breen held that one of New Mexico's workers' compensation provisions violated
the Equal Protection Clauses of both the U.S and New Mexico Constitutions as it
provided less compensation for workers impaired by mental rather than physical
impairments.33' In reaching its decision, the New Mexico Supreme Court decided
that rational basis scrutiny provided insufficient protection for persons with mental
disabilities332 and held that persons with mental disabilities constitute a sensitive
class deserving of intermediate scrutiny protection.333 In arguing for heightened
intermediate scrutiny for the gay community, members of the gay community are
to the court how rational basis protection has proven
able to demonstrate
33
insufficient. 31

In Breen, the New Mexico Supreme Court conducted a two-part analysis of New
Mexico's equal protection clause. 335 The first part of the analysis required the
petitioners to "prove that they are similarly situated to another group but are treated
dissimilarly. 3 36 Upon a successful showing, the court must then determine the level
of scrutiny to be applied to the challenged legislation.337 By affording people with
mental disabilities less compensation and therefore less protection than those with
compensation
physical disabilities, the court held that New Mexico's
338 workers'
legislation treats similarly situated workers differently.
Under Breen, members of the gay community will be able to show how New
Mexico law treats them differently than similarly situated individuals who are not
gay. 339 For example, if the issue raised is the government's denial of domestic
partnership benefits or the inability to enter some form of legally recognized union,
members of the gay community can demonstrate that they are treated differently

327. Cf.Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 120 P.3d 413.
328. Cf id.
329. id. 8, 120 P.3d at 417.
330. See supra note 313.
331. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, In 7, 50, 120 P.3d at 417, 427 (stating that equal protection guarantees that
the "government will treat individuals similarly situated in an equal manner").
332. Id. IN 17-29, 120 P.3d at 419-23.
333. Id. 28, 120 P.3d at 422-23.
334. For examples of how rational basis protection has proven insufficient, see supraPart IlI.
§ 18.
335. N.M. CONST. art. lI,
336. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 8, 120 P.3d at 417.

337. Id.
338. Id. 110, 120 P.3d at 417-18.
339. Cf id. 8, 120 P.3d at 417.
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than heterosexuals who are married and receive the benefits of marriage, including
the right to family insurance, and heterosexual couples who have the opportunity to
marry, thereby receiving the benefits of marriage. Through this denial, either in the
form of domestic partner benefits or the right to enter into some form of legal union,
New Mexico law would treat similarly situated individuals of the gay community
dissimilarly.' This differential treatment would cause members of the gay
community to suffer concrete harm.34'
The second step of the Breen analysis is the determination of the appropriate
ulf for intermediate scrutiny, Breen
degree of scrutiny.342 T
To qualify
provides two
options: "The Legislation must either (1) restrict the ability to exercise an important
right or (2) treat the person or persons challenging the constitutionality of the
legislation differently because they belong to a sensitive class., 343 The court held
that, although the legislation did not impact an important or fundamental right, as
people with mental disabilities belong to a sensitive class, they did qualify for
intermediate scrutiny.'
While in City of Cleburne, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to heighten scrutiny
for classifications based upon mental disability as it found these classifications at
times relevant to the state's interests in providing protections and adequate services
to persons with mental disabilities," 5 Breen never cited this relevance factor in its
determination that classifications based on mental disability require intermediate
scrutiny. But, if raised, members of the gay community can argue this factor even
less relevant to classifications based upon sexual orientation.' 6
Members of New Mexico's gay community would be able to meet the
requirements that trigger intermediate scrutiny as they could demonstrate that the
law differentially treats them (1) by restricting the ability to exercise an important
right and/or (2) by treating members of the gay community differently because they
belong to a sensitive class.347 In a challenge for domestic partnership benefits,
members of the gay community may not be able to show that insurance is an
important right. Yet in a challenge to civil union or marriage rights, a same-sex
couple could provide precedent that states that marriage is a fundamental right.3 48

340. Cf.id. 1 10, 120 P.3d at 417-18.
341. See supra notes 125, 133, 167-168 and accompanying text.
342. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, I 11-22, 120 P.3d at 418-21.
343. Id. 17, 120 P.3d at 419.
344. Id. T1I
17, 28, 120 P.3d at 419, 422-23.
345. See City of Clebure v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). The Court held that
classifications denying equal protection demand intermediate or strict scrutiny when the defining feature of that
classification is "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as

worthy or deserving as others." Id.
346. If the state claims that laws protecting members of the gay community demonstrate the relevance in
treating them differently, this argument is rebutted by all laws that protect civil rights on the basis of race and
gender, which do not impact the heightening of scrutiny. The relevance contemplated by the Court in City of
Cleburne relates to laws and state actions, such as those found in special education, that treat persons with mental
disabilities differently because their disability requires the state to provide special accommodations. See id. at 442.
347. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 1 17, 120 P.3d at 419.
348. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942).
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In addition, in a challenge to a law that either denies domestic partnership benefits
or denies the ability to enter some form of legalized partnership, members of the gay
community could demonstrate that the law treats them differently because they
belong to a sensitive class.349
The court in Breen stated that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate for classes
whose historic discrimination results in a systematic denial from participation in the
political process.350 Even after the group makes political advances, the degree of
scrutiny must still apply "to protect against more subtle forms of unconstitutional
discrimination created by unconscious or disguised prejudice. ' 35 ' The court
analogized to cases that determined that gender-based classifications qualify for
intermediate scrutiny to determine that similar protection is required for persons
with mental disabilities.352 As stated in Breen, the similar "historical treatment of
both women and persons with mental disabilities makes it clear that the courts
should be sensitive to classes of people who are discriminated against in this
manner." 353 In spite of the government's remedial measures to overcome this history
of discrimination, 3 there is a continuing need to provide legal protections to people
with mental disabilities. 355 The "history of invidious discrimination" faced by people
with mental disabilities continues to make them susceptible to stereotyping and
further discrimination.35 6
As with persons with mental disabilities, New Mexico's gay community can
demonstrate how, in spite of political advances, members of the gay community
remain subject to "more subtle forms of unconstitutional discrimination created by
unconscious or disguised prejudice. ' 357 The history of discrimination against the gay
community is impossible to deny. Although there have been numerous advances,358
359
the gay community remains subject to both federal and state discrimination
created by the inability to obtain domestic partner benefits,360 in many states the
inability to adopt, 36 ' and in all but one state, the inability to marry. 362 In nearly half

349. Cf.Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 1 28, 120 P.3d at 422-23 (holding that persons with mental disabilities are
treated differently by the law because they belong to a sensitive class).
350. Id. 19, 120 P.3d at 420 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996)).
351. Id. T20, 120 P.3d at 420; see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)
(referring to the more searching judicial scrutiny required when governmental action "curtail[s] the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities").
352. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 19, 120 P.3d at 420.
353. Id. T 20, 120 P.3d at 420; see also id. 22, 120 P.3d at 421 (citing City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461-63 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) (likening the "'lengthy and tragic history' of
segregation and discrimination" of persons with mental disabilities to "the worst excesses of Jim Crow" and
discussing the history of forced institutionalization and sterilization)).
354. Id. IN 23-26, 120 P.3d at 421-22 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000);
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-91 (2002); and Mental Health Parity Act 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-5 (2000) as examples of congressional enactments to demonstrate national trends of affording people with
mental disabilities protections from societal discrimination).
355. Id. 129, 120 P.3d at 423.
356. Id. 25, 120 P.3d at 422.
357. Cf.id.; United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
358. See Human Rights Campaign Found., supranote 112; supra Part IV.B.
359. See supra notes 118, 133, 135-137 and accompanying text.
360. Human Rights Campaign Found., supranote 112.
361. See supra notes 216-243 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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of our states, members of the gay community can be fired merely because they are
gay.363 This history of "invidious discrimination" faced by members of the gay
community continues to make them susceptible to stereotyping and further
discrimination.
Under Breen, the final step in the determination of intermediate scrutiny is the
demonstration of New Mexico's commitment to greater protection for the class.365
In Breen, the court stated that, although persons with mental disabilities are
organized in politically effective ways, "their effective advocacy is seriously
hindered by the need to overcome the already deep-rooted prejudice against their
integration in society. ' , 366 Without heightened scrutiny, the advances gained by
persons with mental disabilities could easily be lost. 367 Political gains do not

"obviate the need for heightened scrutiny to examine legislation that draws
distinctions based on mental disabilities. 368
As with persons with mental disabilities, members of New Mexico's gay
community can demonstrate the state's commitment to provide protections needed
to overcome discrimination.36 9 Moreover, as noted in Breen, members of the gay
community may warrant heightened scrutiny, as they remain affected by "deeprooted prejudice,, 370 and without heightened protection the advances gained could

easily be lost. 371 As with persons with mental disabilities, political and legal gains

made by the gay community "do not obviate the need for heightened scrutiny to
examine legislation that draws distinctions based on ' 3 72 sexual orientation.
Upon a determination that intermediate scrutiny is proper, the last step is its
implementation, under which the court will "balance the importance of the
government interest against the 'burdens imposed on the individual and on
society.' 3 73 In Breen, the court decided that the government's asserted rationale of
preserving the state treasury by not providing additional benefits did not outweigh
the important interest of providing equal benefits to persons with mental
disabilities.374

363.

Only twenty-eight states have law that prohibits an employee's termination on the basis of sexual

orientation. See Human Rights Campaign Found., supra note 112, at 28.
364. Cf. Breen v. Carlsbad Mun. Sch., 2005-NMSC-028, 25, 120 P.3d 413,421. The reality of homophobia
is demonstrated by the increasing number of hate crimes against people purely because they are gay, as well as the
disproportionate suicide rates of gay teens and the fact that many people who are gay do not publicly "come out"
because they fear societal homophobic reaction. See John Alan Cohen, Parental Duties and the Right of
Homosexual Minors to Refuse "Reparative" Therapy, 11 BuFF. WOMEN'S L.J., 67, 69-72 (2002-2003); Nicolyn
Harris & Maurice R. Dyson, Safe Rules or Gay Schools? The Dilemma of Sexual OrientationSegregationin Public
Education, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 186-90 (2004).
365. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 27, 120 P.3d at 422.
366. Id. 1 29, 120 P.3d at 423.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See supra Part ll.B.
370. Cf Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 1 29, 120 P.3d at 423.
371. Cf. id. For a discussion on how rational basis review is not enough to overturn DOMA and anti-adoption
legislation, see supra Part IHL
372. Cf. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 29, 120 P.3d at 422.
373. Id. 31, 120 P.3d at 423 (quoting Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 110 N.M. 621, 629, 798 P.2d 571,
579 (1990)).
374. Id. U 40-45, 130 P.3d at 425-26.
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If a New Mexico court decides that an equal protection challenge brought by
members of the gay community demands intermediate scrutiny, the court must then
decide whether the government has an important interest in treating members of the
gay community differently and whether that interest substantially relates to the ways
in which the law treats gays differently.375 In the case of domestic partner benefits,
as noted earlier, the government will have a difficult time demonstrating that the
cost of providing the benefits is too great to provide.376 While fiscal concerns are
important,377 the cost of providing insurance benefits to domestic partners is
outweighed by the costs created by the uninsured.37 8 If the challenge brought before
the court is that of legally recognized partnerships, the question becomes more
difficult given the current national climate against same-sex unions. 379 However, as
New Mexico has successfully blocked DOMA legislation 380 and has a gender neutral
statute that led to the marriage of over sixty same-sex couples in 2004,38' it will be
difficult for a New Mexico court to be persuaded that New Mexico has any public
policy against same-sex unions.
As members of New Mexico's gay community could demonstrate that (1) they
are treated differently than similarly situated heterosexuals; (2) this differential
treatment is because they are gay; (3) in spite of political and legal advances, they
require additional equal protection than rational basis review provides; (4) New
Mexico's political and legal practice demonstrates a strong commitment to
providing the gay community with equal protection; (5) in spite of New Mexico's
demonstrated commitment, more is needed to provide members of the gay community with equal protection; and (6) as the government's important fiscal interest
is outweighed by the need to provide members of the gay community with equal
protection under the law, members of New Mexico's gay community should be able
to survive the test set out in Breen. In so doing, New Mexico would become the first
state to officially raise its equal protection scrutiny not only for its community with
mental disabilities, but also for its gay community. With over thirty years of history
to demonstrate that New Mexico's policy is to provide greater protections to
members of the gay community, New Mexico may be able to accomplish this
unprecedented challenge.
In Breen, the Supreme Court of New Mexico recognized that "the Equal Protection Clause of the New Mexico Constitution affords 'rights and protections'
independent of the United States Constitution. ' '382 The court stated that, while it

375. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
376. See supranote 323 (demonstrating New Mexico's high rates of uninsured residents). New Mexico courts
require, even under rational basis review, that the interest be based in fact or law. In New Mexico, there is no fact
of policy or law to demonstrate New Mexico's commitment to anything but protection of the gay community. See
supra notes 291-296 and accompanying text.
377. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 47, 120 P.3d at 426 (noting that the government's fiscal concern about
expanding workers' compensation benefits is an important interest).
378. See supra note 323.
379. See supra notes 130, 133-137.
380. See supra note 313.
381. See supra notes 311-313.
382. Breen, 2005-NMSC-028, 14, 120 P.3d at 418 (stating that, "[wihile we take guidance from the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and the federal courts' interpretation of it, we will nonetheless
interpret the New Mexico Constitution's Equal Protection Clause independently when appropriate").
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looks to "federal case law for the basic definitions for the three-tiered
approach[,] ... [it has] applied those definitions to different groups and rights than the

federal courts. 383 New Mexico's judicial approach to equal protection analysis is
its own, and it may not provide other states with a model to follow. Under its equal
protection law, members of the gay community both demand and deserve a higher
degree of scrutiny than rational basis. This holding would go a long way toward
overcoming a decade of judicial rulings upholding law that unfairly differentiates
members of the gay community solely because they are not heterosexual.
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect.3 '
A primary function of the U.S. Supreme Court is its supervisory role. The Court's
opinions are the "supreme law of the land,' 385 and what they provide in terms of
civil rights and equal protection is the constitutional floor that a state must provide.
In light of a decade of precedent that cites Romer as the case in which the Court held
rational basis the appropriate scrutiny for law that denies members of the gay
community equal protection, Romer has served the gay community poorly, as this
decade has upheld nearly all law aimed at their disparate treatment. Perhaps lower
courts fail to read Romer thoroughly, or perhaps lower courts simply are hesitant to
give Romer a broader reading. As courts face increased attacks of "judicial
activism," it is not surprising that judges take a more conservative (even if incorrect)
reading of Romer, especially as most judges, unless protected by Article I, face reelection.
Romer v. Evans remains a landmark decision as it is the first time the Supreme
Court declared that legislation fueled by pure animus towards the gay community
is neither legal nor tolerable. However, as Romer stands as a beacon for the gay
community in their struggle for equal protection, its success is shadowed by the
precedent discussed throughout this Comment and by an era in which anti-gay law
has been promulgated and upheld under the guise of Romer. While it is easy to place
the burden of this failure on the lower courts, either because they just did not read
Romer fully or because they chose not to, the failure may rest with the U.S. Supreme
Court. If the role of the Court's opinion is supervisory, the question a decade later
is, how well has Romer supervised? If the intent of the Romer Court was to send a
message of equal protection for the gay community, Romer has not supervised well.
If the Court's intent was to pronounce that law excluding the gay community from
the protection of all three branches will not be constitutionally tolerated, Romer was
both a success and a failure for the gay community. It was a success because no law
as exclusionary as Amendment 2 has since been attempted. It was a failure because,
ever since the Court struck down Amendment 2, governments have successfully

383. Id.
384. Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
385. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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used it as a draft-writing guide. As long as governments do not write a law to
exclude gays entirely from all three branches of government, the law will most
likely survive a judicial equal protection challenge under Romer. Maybe the Court's
directions were not clear enough. On the other hand, maybe the Court would not
have had a majority if the majority opinion had been written with more direction.
For whatever reason, a decade later, the lesson of Romer is that rational basis
review will not provide the gay community equal protection under the law.
Although this Comment demonstrates both the failure of Romer as well as an
opportunity to resolve the scrutiny issues created by Romer, this is still not enough.
Equality and equal protection cannot be accomplished until the majority of this
nation accepts that legislation that discriminates against and marginalizes the gay
community serves no purpose, let alone a rational one.

